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JUST BLOWING SMOKE? POLITICS,
DOCTRINE, AND THE FEDERALIST
REVIVAL AFTER GONZALES v RAICH
Most assessments of ChiefJustice Rehnquist's jurisprudential legacy
have placed federalism firmly at its center.' And yet, a full decade
after the Court's revival of limits on the commerce power in United
States v Lopez,2 grave doubts remain about the Chief's "Federalist
Revival." Some of these doubts concern the advisability-both as
a matter of judicial restraint and of substantive policy-of limiting
national power. The doubts upon which I wish to focus here, how-
ever, go to the seriousness of the Court's enterprise. That serious-
ness might be doubted on two distinct grounds. First, many ob-
servers have argued that the Rehnquist Court's commitment to
federalism is unprincipled, that is, that federalism merely provides
an instrument for the achievement of politically conservative policy
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results. This criticism generally comes with a prediction that the
Court will abandon federalism at the moment it ceases to promote
such results. Second, others have argued that the Court's federalism
jurisprudence is unsustainable, that is, either that the doctrinal for-
mulations employed are incapable of rolling national power back
any significant distance, or that the Court simply lacks the resolve
to take its federalism very far.
Last Term's decision in Gonzales v Raich3 put the Court's seri-
ousness to the test along both these dimensions. California legalized
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes-a position generally
identified with politically liberal social policy. The national gov-
ernment, by contrast, has taken a more politically conservative line
by barring marijuana use across the board. The question in Raich
was whether the federal Controlled Substances Act could, within
the limits of Congress's commerce power, prohibit the medicinal
uses of marijuana that California wished to permit. Many observers
predicted that the Court's "Federalist Five" would forget all about
federalism in their rush to throw the book at pot smokers; some
even wondered if the more liberal "Fab Four" might eschew their
usually generous view of national power in order to help out the
suffering patients.4
Raich also tested the sustainability of the doctrinal line taken in
Lopez and United States v Morrison.' Whatever the symbolic value
of striking down federal laws in the latter two cases, the actual
statutes involved had little practical importance. Raich, by contrast,
challenged the federal Controlled Substances Act-a veritable par-
adigm of a big important federal statute. Doctrinally, the arguments
in Raich applied maximum pressure to the weakest points in the
Court's articulated tests under the Commerce Clause. In particular,
it was hardly obvious how to characterize the regulated activity for
purposes of telling whether it was "commercial" or "economic" in
nature, and the government was able to advance strong claims that
barring even noncommercial uses of marijuana was "necessary and
125 S Ct 2195 (2005).
See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Dude, Where's My Integrity? Medical Marijuana Tests the
Supreme Court's True Love of Federalism, Slate (Nov 29, 2004), available at http://www
.slate.com/id/2110204/; Ann Althouse, The Marijuana Case: A Great Test of Law and
Politics, Althouse (Nov 28, 2004), available at http://althouse.blogspot.com/2004/l/
marijuana-case-great-test-of-law-and.html.
5 529 US 598 (2000) (striking down a portion of the federal Violence Against Women
Act as outside the commerce power).
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proper" to a broader scheme for regulating the interstate market
in illicit drugs. To affirm the Ninth Circuit, which had held Angel
Raich's use of medicinal marijuana off-limits to federal regulation, 6
the Court would have had to broaden and deepen its Commerce
Clause doctrine considerably.
This the Rehnquist Court declined to do, and in so holding it
invited-and received-vigorous questions about its seriousness in
federalism cases. Those questions come, moreover, at a time of
major transition for the Court. As the Roberts Court gets under-
way in the 2005 Term-and as the Court's most consistently pro-
federalism member, Sandra Day O'Connor, rides off into the
sunset-those of us who write about federalism can plausibly won-
der whether we will soon be in the unenviable position of freedom
of contract experts after 1937.
This essay addresses the question of seriousness in three stages.
Part I argues that Raich was mostly encouraging from the standpoint
of principled decision making; virtually all the Justices, after all,
held to their established positions on federalism doctrine irrespec-
tive of the political valence of the issue in the case. Part II is more
pessimistic from a doctrinal perspective. I contend that doctrinal
approaches were available to the Court that would have restricted.
national power in Raich without crippling national authority or mir-
ing the Court in unavoidably subjective analysis; the Court simply
chose not to take them. The only silver lining is that the case was
a legitimately difficult one, such that the United States' victory
should not necessarily be seen as a portent that the Federalist Re-
vival has ground to a halt. I take up that predictive point in Part
III, seeking to read the meager tea leaves available as to the future
course of the Court's federalism jurisprudence.
I. A (MOsTLY) GoOD DAY FOR PRINCIPLE
The conventional wisdom before the Court handed down
its decision in Raich was that the government would win 7-which
it did. Many observers expected Raich to confirm their long-held
suspicions that the Court's federalism jurisprudence was merely a
cover for the political preferences of the Justices. And, to some
6Raich v Ashcroft, 352 F2d 1222 (9th Cir 2003).
' See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, States' Rights Defense Falters in Medical Marijuana Case,
NY Times (Nov 30, 2004), at A20 (reporting on the oral argument).
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extent, the Court's decision to change course in Raich might be
viewed as confirming that hypothesis: Confronted with a politically
liberal state advancing a politically liberal social policy, the mostly
conservative Court upheld Congress's right to impose a more po-
litically conservative solution. Peter Smith, for example, has written
that "it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the outcome of the
Rehnquist Court's final federalism decision was influenced by
policy-focused instrumentalism."'
I have never had much sympathy for these sorts of explanations
for judicial decisions. Although such claims are often dressed in the
analytical trappings of political science,9 it is frightfully difficult to
prove that any given judicial decision was motivated by something
other than the account offered in the opinion. Nor, in my view, is
the political account a good guide to what happened in Raich itself.
I begin with the Court's medical marijuana decision, then offer some
more general observations about the political account of the Court's
federalism cases.
A. A GLASS EIGHT-NINTHS FULL
The political or instrumentalist account of the Court's feder-
alism cases is that the Justices favor federalism when it advances
their political preferences, and they discard it when it does not."
Hence the Court's conservative majority limited national power
in order to preserve the right to own or possess firearms-sup-
posedly a "conservative" right-in Lopez and Printz (and the lib-
erals dissented). 1 Likewise, a conservative majority suspicious of
the rights of plaintiffs in litigation protected state governmental
defendants from liability in state sovereign immunity cases like
Alden and Garrett (and the liberals dissented).12 In a range of pre-
' Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74
Geo Wash L Rev (forthcoming 2006).
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited (Cambridge, 2002).
0 See, e.g., Frank Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 NYU L Rev 1304, 1307-12 (1999).
See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) (striking down the national Gun Free
School Zones Act as outside the commerce power); Printz v United States, 521 US 898
(1997) (striking down portions of the Brady Act that "commandeered" state officials to
enforce national gun control laws).
2 See Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not override state
sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its commerce power, even for suits in state
court); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001) (holding
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emption cases, by contrast, the liberals adopted a federalist pose
in order to promote state governmental regulation while the more
laissez-faire conservatives broadly construed less rigorous federal
regulatory measures to supersede tougher state standards. 3 The
Raich result surely fits this pattern: A Court that had used the
Commerce Clause to limit federal initiatives of a liberal stripe
suddenly experienced a change of heart when asked to shelter some
California pot smokers from federal prosecution.
But the Supreme Court is a "they," not an "it,14 and the votes
of the individual Justices paint a considerably different picture.
The most obvious version of the political hypothesis would have
expected Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice
Thomas to vote in favor of cracking down on marijuana use; like-
wise, that hypothesis would forecast the four liberals (Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) casting their votes against the
government. Instead, all seven of these Justices voted to affirm
their previously expressed legal commitments on federalism and
the Commerce Clause. That hardly seems to vindicate the political
hypothesis. Unless we expect perfection, Raich seems like a prima
facie vindication of principle over politics. By this count the glass
is neither half full nor half empty-rather, it is seven-ninths full.
One can, of course, quibble. The Chief Justice, already battling
the cancer that would take his life a year later, might have sacrificed
his lifelong love of law enforcement not for federalist principle,
but rather for a different, and more personal, political preference
for broad access to pain-mitigating drugs."s Justice O'Connor-
likewise no stranger to cancer-has also noted the importance of
that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits under Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
" See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 US 525 (2001) (holding that federal warning
labels on cigarettes preempted more extensive state restrictions on tobacco advertising);
Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861 (2000) (holding that federal regulations
phasing in airbag requirements for cars preempted state common law products liability
suits); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U Chi L Rev 429, 471-72 (2002) (observing that the Court's
conservatives generally favor federal preemption of state law, and the Court's liberals
generally oppose it); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 Tex L
Rev 1, 30-32, 41-45 (2004) (noting the same phenomenon, and suggesting that this
disparity reflects different views as to the point of federalism).
"4 Apologies to Kenneth M. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 239 (1992).
" Personally, I do not find it at all plausible that the Chief's personal circumstances
would have shaped his vote. I raise the possibility simply to highlight the indeterminacy
of the political hypothesis.
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access to pain relief. 6 And Justice Thomas's conservatism has
shown a libertarian streak, 7 such that he might have voted as he
did in order to further a political preference for rolling back reg-
ulation of private activity. These sorts of arguments, however, do
more to undermine the political hypothesis than to save it. Many
of us, as the Chief possibly did, harbor a variety of cross-cutting
political preferences that may bear on a particular case, and the
effect is to make the political hypothesis nonfalsifiable: Whichever
way the Chief jumped, one could have constructed a political ac-
count of what pushed him. Likewise, my uncertainty about Justice
Thomas highlights just how capacious our definitions of political
ideologies like "conservatism" and "liberalism" really are. Given
the availability of competing strands within each of these tradi-
tions, it is easy to formulate a political account either way in many
(if not most) cases.' 8 That makes it difficult to identify those cases
in which any given Justice may have been tugged in opposite
directions by politics and legal principle.
Most legal principles, moreover, have a stopping point, although
different lawyers may disagree about that point's location. Justice
Scalia voted with the pro-states majorities in Lopez and Morrison,
but he concurred in rejecting the Commerce Clause challenge in
Raich. Does that mean he was inconsistent, and that he placed the
politics of drug control over federalist principle? Federalism is
inherently about the balance between national and state author-
ity, 19 and different people-as a matter of principle-will plausibly
strike that balance in different places. Justice Scalia's commitment
to a radical reordering of the current allocation of authority has
always been a bit suspect: He is an "executive branch conservative"
whose nonacademic legal career consisted largely of federal gov-
ernment service and whose academic career focused on federal
6 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 736 (1997) (O'Connor, J, concurring).
7 See, e.g., Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J, dissenting) ("If I
were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal [the Texas anti-sodomy
law]. Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial
consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend
valuable law enforcement resources.").
i" Moreover, if we treat Justice Thomas as a politically motivated libertarian vote, then
we may have to move Justice Kennedy into the "principled" column for voting against his
own libertarian tendencies in Raich.
"9 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1733, 1750-53 (2005).
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administrative law.2" It seems plausible that he thought it impor-
tant to affirm the limiting force of constitutional text in Lopez and
Morrison without feeling any strong desire to roll back more sig-
nificant federal statutes, like the Controlled Substances Act.2' That
would hardly prove Scalia's vote was motivated by politics-rather,
it simply suggests that he has been pursuing a more limited prin-
ciple of federalism than, say, Justice O'Connor.
Justice Kennedy's vote, on the other hand, does seem plausibly
explicable by the political hypothesis. He is well known for his
hostility to drug use,22 and he may also be more sensitive than
most to another form of political pressure in the form of a desire
to appear statesmanlike by "moderating" the Court's federalism
jurisprudence.23 (Query whether the latter is really a "political"
impulse at all, rather than a methodological commitment to in-
crementalism.24 ) The important point, however, is that the force
of the political hypothesis seems a bit attenuated when it can really
only account for one or possibly two votes in a major case like
20 See Thomas W Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 SLU L J 569, 609-12 (2003). But see Bradford R. Clark, The Constitutional
Structure and the Jurisprudence ofJustice Scalia, 47 SLU LJ 753 (2003) (insisting thatJustice
Scalia really does care about federalism). As I discuss further in Part III, Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito share a similar background.
21 See Part IIJ.C for a discussion of the various commitments that might prompt a
conservative jurist to care about federalism as a constitutional principle.
22 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Commentary: Justice Kennedy and the "War on Drugs," SCO-
TUSblog (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
2005/06/commentary-just.html.
23 Cf. David G. Savage, The Rescue of Roe v Wade, LA Times (Dec 13, 1992), at Al
(discussing Justice Kennedy's decision to pursue a moderate course in Planned Parenthood
v Casey). A defender of Justice Kennedy might plausibly ask why I am unwilling to attribute
to him precisely the same limited commitment to limiting national power that I attributed
to Justice Scalia. It is, of course, hard to know-this sort of psychoanalysis does not come
easy to lawyers, and my ultimate argument is that it is not worth doing. Justice Kennedy's
opinions both inside and outside the federalism area, however, indicate greater comfort
with the exercise of judicial power than Justice Scalia's do. Compare, e.g., Roper v Simmons,
543 US 551, 574-75 (2005) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J, overruling prior precedent
and striking down juvenile death penalty based "evolving norms of decency"), and Lawrence
v Texas, 539 US 558, 578-79 (2003) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J, striking down anti-
sodomy law under broad and unenumerated right to personal autonomy), with Roper, 543
US at 607-08 (Scalia, J, dissenting), and Lawrence, 539 US at 586 (Scalia, J, dissenting);
see also United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 579 (1995) (Kennedy, J, concurring) ("But as
the branch whose distinctive duty it is to declare 'what the law is, . . . we are often called
upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical appli-
cation of bright and clear lines."). It is thus easier to imagine that Scalia-as opposed to
Kennedy-would be uncomfortable with judicial implementation of a "necessity" require-
ment under the Necessary and Proper Clause, for example. See Part II.B (discussing the
necessity issue in Raich).
24 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 6 (1996).
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this. Under the circumstances, the hypothesis would be more a
biographical point about Justice Kennedy than a useful hypothesis
about the Supreme Court as an institution.
Attitudinalists might respond, of course, by noting that Justice
Kennedy has long been a swing vote on the court, and his influence
is likely to increase with Justice O'Connor's departure. 21 Predict-
ing the behavior of the "median Justice" thus will often mean
predicting the outcome of critical cases. But the political hypoth-
esis purports not only to provide a predictive tool but also to state
a more fundamental truth about law and courts-that is, that legal
principle does not constrain judges, and the doctrinal explanations
offered in judicial opinions are simply post hoc rationalizations
meant to mask the pursuit of naked political preferences. 26 The
positions taken by an overwhelming majority of the Justices in
Raich do not support that hypothesis.
Despite how the case came out, then, the glass is seven- or
(more likely) eight-ninths full. Almost all of the Justices adhered
to established positions on federalism and the Commerce Clause,
notwithstanding an apparent shift in the political valence of this
case from previous ones raising similar issues. One decent case,
of course, is hardly enough to disprove the political hypothesis.
As I discuss in the next section, however, that hypothesis has
broader problems.
B. THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERALIST REVIVAL
The political hypothesis-sometimes called the "attitudinal
model" by political scientists-suggests that politics, not legal
principle, drikes judicial decision making.27 Judge Richard Posner
25 See Paul H. Edelman and Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting
the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 Minn L Rev 131 (2001) (identifying Justice Kennedy
as the "most dangerous" Justice of the 1994-2000 terms); Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as
the Next Justice in Court's Middle, Washington Post (Jan 31, 2006), at A4 ("Alito's arrival
. . . may turn the O'Connor Court into the Kennedy Court.").
26 See Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 86 (cited in note 9).
27 See, e.g., id; Smith, 74 Geo Wash L Rev (cited in note 8). The attitudinal model is
increasingly under siege in political science circles from practitioners of positive political
theory (PPT), which rejects the attitudinalist's image of individual Justices largely un-
constrained from following their political preferences in favor of a model of strategic
Justices who are constrained by the choices made by their fellows and the other institutional
characteristics of their environment. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez and Matthew D.
McCubbins, The Judiciary and the Role of Law: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, in B.
Weingast and D. Wittman, eds, Handbook on Political Economy (Oxford, 2006) (available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract = 875025); Forrest Maltzman, James E Spriggs II, and Paul J.
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recently endorsed this view, at least as it applies to constitutional
cases in the Supreme Court, in his Harvard Law Review "Fore-
word."28 Judge Posner aside, however, pursuit of political pref-
erence is certainly not how the judges say they decide the cases,
and it is inconsistent with much anecdotal evidence from people
who have worked with them. For example, when I went to clerk
for a federal appeals court judge after wrestling with Critical Legal
Studies for three years in law school, one of the very first questions
that the judge asked me about a case was, "What's the right an-
swer?" (I wanted to hug him.) Not surprisingly, most proponents
of the political hypothesis seem to concede that judges do not
consciously vote their political preferences; the proponents insist,
rather, that the influence of politics is subconscious-but none-
theless dispositive.29
Because the political hypothesis takes this form, its plausibility
depends heavily on its ability to predict results. Indeed, one of the
attitudinalists' primary criticisms of the "legal model"-which pos-
its that judges are constrained to follow the preexisting legal ma-
terials-is that the latter model is not "falsifiable" empirically.3"
Attitudinalists have thus assembled a vast database of Supreme
Court decisions, coded according to their political valence, which
are then correlated to the supposed political predispositions of the
Justices.3 While this approach is a valuable effort to introduce
some analytical rigor into the usual speculation about why judges
do what they do, it suffers from similar problems of indeterminacy
to those that plague doctrinal analysis. This is not the place for
a thoroughgoing critique of the attitudinal model. What I hope
to do instead is to point up some conceptual difficulties with the
Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court
Decision-Making, in C. Clayton and H. Gillman, eds, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
Institutionalist Approaches 43 (Chicago, 1999). The PPT perspective, however, shares the
attitudinalist assumption that judges seek to maximize their preferences rather than seek
some sort of legal "right answer."
28 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119
Harv L Rev 31 (2005).
21 See id at 52; Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 433 (cited in note 9) (remaining
agnostic as to the judges' conscious motives).
30 See Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 46-47 (cited in note 9).
The various databases are available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
sctdata.htm. For explanatory documentation, see Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2003 Terms: Documentation (2005) (available
at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt-Codebook.pdf).
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political hypothesis and to illustrate the havoc wrought by those
difficulties upon an effort to assess Raich.32
An effort to demonstrate that the political or policy preferences
of the Justices control their votes in particular cases faces two
basic problems of characterization: One must coherently charac-
terize the preexisting preferences of the Justices, and one must
also characterize votes in particular cases in terms that map onto
the Justices' defined preferences. Some version of these two prob-
lems would arise regardless of the method by which the assessment
proceeds; for an empirical project like the attitudinal model, the
problems become problems of coding. Attitudinalists have thus
undertaken to rate individual Justices as "conservative" or "liberal"
and to code case votes in the same binary terms. If either set of
coding criteria is unreliable or indeterminate, then the results of
the model fall into serious question.
Take the Justices first. The leading attitudinalists derive the
Justices' individual predispositions from surveys of newspaper cov-
erage at the time of each Justice's nomination.33 It is common
knowledge, however, that initial assessments-by well-informed
professionals, much less newspaper editorial boards-often turn
out to be wrong. So it is unsurprising that the attitudinalist method
produces some real howlers: Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold
Spaeth list the younger Justice Harlan as a strong liberal, Justice
Powell as equally conservative as Justice Thomas, Justice Black-
mun as more conservative than Justice Thomas, and Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, and Breyer as moderate conservatives.34 Not sur-
prisingly, the attitudinalists do not actually seem to stick with these
initial ratings. Segal and Spaeth's discussion of the Rehnquist
Court, for example, consistently treats Justice Souter as a liberal,
notwithstanding his conservative score based on their initial cri-
32 The space devoted to the attitudinal model here is arguably disproportionate to its
actual stature in political science. See, e.g., H. W. Perry, Taking Political Science Seriously,
47 SLU L J 889, 891 (2003) (observing that "many (I dare say most) public law political
scientists, let alone political scientists generally, have never taken the attitudinal model
that seriously"). The model's acceptance by influential legal scholars like Judge Posner,
however, suggests that the model is worth taking on. Moreover, the Spaeth database of
Supreme Court opinions has been employed more broadly by political scientists studying
the Court from a variety of perspectives. To the extent that some of my objections go to
the coding of that database, they implicate that broader body of work.
" See Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 321 (cited in note 9); Jeffrey Segal and
Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 Am Pol
Sci Rev 557 (1989).
"' See Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 322 (cited in note 9).
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teria.3 s That sort of modification, however, opens the attitudinal-
ists to the charge of circularity. If one reclassifies Justices' personal
ideology based on their subsequent votes,36 then one cannot then
use the correlation between the Justices' ideology and votes to
prove anything about causation.
A more fundamental problem with coding both the preferences
of Justices and the valence of votes is that we lack any coherent
definition of "liberal" or "conservative." Political theorists noto-
riously disagree about the meanings of these terms.37 Lawrence v
Texas,3" striking down a Texas anti-sodomy law, was widely con-
demned by social and religious conservatives, yet it was applauded
by libertarian conservatives.39 If the coder's definition of "conser-
vative" is capacious enough to include both social conservatives
and libertarians, it becomes possible to code virtually any outcome
in a case about privacy rights and the like as either conservative
or liberal. The Court's decisions on cross-burnings0 show a sim-
ilar divide on the liberal side. Free speech liberals have long op-
posed any restrictions on expressive activity, yet other liberals more
focused on the question of equality for racial minorities have
strongly argued for such restrictions.41 Again, the availability of a
" Professors Segal and Spaeth note, for example, that Justice Souter voted to strike
down 42.3 percent of "liberal" laws and 74.2 percent of "conservative" laws without ex-
pressing any surprise that Souter voted against his predicted ideology, see id at 415-16
and Table 10.1. Presumably this is based on a perfectly plausible-but unexplained-
judgment that he is actually part of the Court's more liberal bloc.
36 I have seen no indication that the attitudinalists perform a reevaluation of newspaper
assessments years into a Justice's tenure. See Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The
Authors Respond, 4 Law & Courts 10, 10 (Spring 1994) (conceding that their model "does
not even attempt" to account for changes in attitudes).
"7 For an introduction, see the two companion volumes edited by Peter Berkowitz,
Varieties of Conservatism in America (2004) (surveying "classical conservatism," "libertari-
anism," and "neoconservatism"), and Varieties of Progressivism in America (2004) (surveying
different positions on the American left). I have catalogued the very divergent strands of
conservatism elsewhere. Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U
Colo L Rev 1139, 1181-1203 (2002).
38 539 US 558 (2003).
31 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 334 (Princeton, 2003) (ap-
plauding Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence as protecting "liberty" rather than "pri-
vacy"). One might be tempted to write off libertarian outcomes as not conservative at all,
yet the libertarian position is strongly identified with conservatism when it comes to
economic regulation. Does anyone doubt that the attitudinalists should and would code
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905), as a conservative decision?
4
°See RAVv City of St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992); Virginia v Black, 538 US 343 (2003).
Compare, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431 (arguing for restrictions on hate speech), with
12 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
liberal argument for either result in many such speech cases means
that coding the results for attitudinal model purposes involves a
difficult question of judgment.
Equally important, the different factors used to code a case as
"conservative" or "liberal" may cut in different directions within
the confines of a single case. The Spaeth database, for example,
codes a case as "liberal" if it invalidates a criminal conviction,
and "conservative" if it limits national power on federalism
grounds.42 So what to do with a case like Lopez, which did both
things at the same time? Raich, of course, would present precisely
the same problem in reverse: The prevailing majority refused to
enjoin enforcement of a criminal statute (conservative) but re-
jected a state-autonomy-based challenge to federal legislation
(liberal).43
What is a coder to do in such situations? When the prearranged
criteria conflict, one of two things seems likely to happen: The
coders may resolve the conflict based on some gestalt judgment that
would be difficult to articulate and defend.' Alternatively, the cod-
ers might analyze the doctrinal issues in the case to determine which
dimension of the decision (e.g., Lopez's restriction of national power
or its windfall to the individual defendant) is more salient. But this
approach accords a critical role to doctrine that the attitudinalists
generally seem at pains to deny. In any event, the indeterminacy of
coding cases and Justices casts considerable doubt on the attitudinal
model's great strength-its strong predictive success. Without de-
terminate coding criteria, we cannot be sure that the people com-
Nadine R. Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal? 1990 Duke L
J 484 (opposing such restrictions).
42 See Spaeth, Documentation at 57-60 (cited in note 31).
In fact, the current version of the Spaeth database classifies Raich as a "conservative"
outcome-just as it classified Lopez and Morrison. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original U.S.
Supreme Court Judicial Database, available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
sctdata.htm.
4 See Howard Gillman, Separating the Wheat from the Chaff in the Supreme Court and
the Attitudinal Model Revisited, 13 Law & Courts 12, 17 n 12 (Summer 2003) (reporting
a concession by Professor Spaeth that coding decisions are conducted "ad hoc"). It seems
at least possible that, much as initial classifications of a Justice's ideological position seem
to be revised in light of his votes in subsequent cases, difficult calls about whether to code
a given case as liberal or conservative may be resolved by looking at who voted for and
against the result. This would, of course, pose a similar circularity problem. See Segal
and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 47 (cited in note 9) ("[A]n attitudinal model that measures
the justices' attitudes by their voting behavior and then explains their votes by their
attitudes would . . . be unfalsifiable.").
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piling the relevant databases are not doing so in a way that simply
confirms what they expected to find.4 5
In the Commerce Clause cases, the Spaeth database seems to pri-
oritize factors based on the specific result over structural views about
federalism. The database classifies Lopez, Morrison, and Raich as all
"conservative" decisions, presumably because the federal statutes
struck down in the first two cases embodied "liberal" policies of gun
control and gender equality, while the federal law upheld in Raich
stifled a liberal California experiment in drug policy.4' But thinking
about the results in these terms simply is not very persuasive with
regard to a number of key cases in the Federalist Revival. Does anyone
really think that the Court struck down the federal Gun Free School
Zones Act in Lopez because the Court was so pro-gun that it did not
care about the safety of schoolchildren? Or that it struck down the
civil remedy under the Violence Against Women Act in Morrison
because the Court was pro-violence against women? Or that the result
in Seminole Tribe v Florida47 had anything to do with the Justices'
preconceived political preferences regarding the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act? The more plausible account is that the Justices in
the majority in these cases were acting on a more general preference
for state autonomy and sovereignty over national power, and in fact
the Segal-Spaeth database allows for coding decisions about feder-
alism issues as "conservative" simply on the ground that they are
pro-states. But on that sort of criterion, one can hardly classify Lopez
and Raich as the same, given their diametrically opposed conclusions
on Commerce Clause doctrine.
We might, of course, simply take the Spaeth database's classi-
fication of Raich as a conservative decision to be a mistake, given
the decision's nationalist orientation. Peter Smith's account of the
state sovereign immunity cases, for example, properly concedes
that it is hard to assign any political valence to these cases in
terms of their particular results.4 8 While cases like Kimel49 and
" See Gillman, 13 Law & Courts at 14-15 (cited in note 44) (suggesting that "maybe
the books have been cooked a little bit to make the correlations a little better").
46 See Spaeth, Database (cited in note 43).
47 517 US 44 (1996) (holding that the judicial enforcement provision of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act was invalid under the Eleventh Amendment).
41 See Smith, 74 Geo Wash L Rev (cited in note 8).
41Ki'mel v Fla Bd of Regents, 528 US 62 (2000) (striking down a provision of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act that sought to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
damages suits brought under the Act).
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Garrett5" made it more difficult for federal rights plaintiffs to re-
cover for discrimination, for example, cases like Florida Prepaid51
impinged on the interests of the business community in the intel-
lectual property field, and cases like Seminole Tribe were so ambig-
uous as to whose ox had really been gored as to defy political
classification.52 Leaving the sovereign immunity cases out, however,
would seriously weaken any argument that the Federalist Revival
bears a political stamp overall; as I have long argued, the sovereign
immunity cases are at the heart of the Rehnquist Court's vision of
federalism. 3 The obvious alternative would be to say that the im-
munity cases reflect a strong preference that state governments not
be subject to suit-a preference that is part and parcel of a "con-
servative" commitment to limiting national power.
This move, however, reveals a more fundamental difficulty with
many versions of the political hypothesis. The problem is that it is
hard to distinguish between a "preference" for federalism of the
sort just described and a good faith legal view about the meaning
of the Constitution. In the immunity cases, for instance, how much
conceptual daylight is there between a "preference" that states not
be subject to suit and a legal conviction that the Constitution con-
tains a strong principle of state immunity?5 4 One cannot prove the
50 Bd of Trs of the Univ. of Ala v Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001) (striking down a provision
of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act that sought to abrogate state sovereign
immunity in damages suits brought under the Act).
" Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Bd v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627 (1999) (striking
down a provision of the Patent Remedy Clarification Act that sought to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in damages suits for patent infringement); see also Chavez v Arte
Publico Press, 157 F3d 282 (5th Cir 1998) (invalidating Congress's attempt to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in copyright cases).
" It was highly unclear in Seminole Tribe whether the State of Florida was really better
off once it had been held immune from suit under the IGRA. The Act was designed to
permit states some say in regulating gaming on Indian reservations, and the anti-state suit
provisions were designed to allow the tribes to compel states to negotiate agreements
under which gaming proceeds. After holding that these anti-state suit provisions were
invalid, the Eleventh Circuit held them severable from the remainder of the Act. See
Seminole Tribe v Florida, 11 F3d 1016, 1029 (1lth Cir 1994), aff'd, 517 US 44 (1996). The
result was that a nonconsenting state would be cut out of the process entirely, and reg-
ulations for gaming would be promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
" See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 2 (cited in note 13); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Supreme Court Review 1, 1-2.
" One frequent answer is to say that the immunity cases reflect a politically conservative
hostility to civil plaintiffs. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court:
An Admiring Reply to Professor Merrill, 47 SLU L J 659, 665-69 (2003). That answer is
problematic on several levels. In cases like Florida Prepaid, the unfortunate plaintiffs are,
in fact, the very same sort of corporate business entities that conservatives usually stiff
plaintiffs in order to defend. Moreover, one would expect a Court that was simply out to
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primacy of political preferences over legal principle if one's defi-
nition of political preferences is so broad as to include legal prin-
ciples.
The attitudinal critique in political science tends to an across-
the-board assault on law as a meaningful determinant of judicial
outcomes. In the legal literature, however, accusations that the
Court behaves politically are often localized to particular doctrinal
areas. As Peter Smith's recent essay demonstrates,55 the Rehnquist
Court's federalism jurisprudence is a particularly common target.
But this sort of selectivity opens the instrumentalist account itself
to the charge of instrumentalism. Why is the Court's federalism
jurisprudence constantly critiqued as instrumentalist, while the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, for example, is not?56 Pro-
fessor Smith, to his credit, recognizes the problem and attempts an
answer: Federalism cases, he says, are more troubling because fed-
eralism has been associated in the past with unsavory causes like
slavery and segregation.57 We should be more worried about in-
strumentalist judging, in other words, when the policy ends to be
served are bad ones.
make states hard to sue to limit damages suits by plaintiffs against state officers. Cf. John
Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment-and of Section 1983, 84 Va L Rev 47 (1998)
(arguing that the availability of damages suits against officers largely eliminates the practical
impact of state sovereign immunity on plaintiffs' ability to recover). Yet the Court has
done little to guard the flank of state immunity by shoring up the common law immunities
of individual officers; indeed, in perhaps the most important line of cases, it has refused
to extend official immunity to private entities exercising functions delegated to them by
governmental bodies. See Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158 (1992); Richardson v McKnight, 521
US 399 (1997).
5 Smith, 74 Geo Wash L Rev (cited in note 8); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1313, 1328
(2004).
56 The most obvious example of instrumental instrumentalism is the widespread tendency
to charge that the majority Justices in Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000), voted to elect their
favored presidential candidate, without leveling a similar accusation at the four dissenters,
who are equally vulnerable to charges of partisanship. See, e.g.,JackA. Balkin and Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va L Rev 1045, 1049-50 (2001)
(describing the majority as "[f]ive members of the United States Supreme Court, confident
of their power, and brazen in their authority" and claiming the majority "engaged in
flagrant judicial misconduct that undermined the foundations of constitutional govern-
ment"-without any censure of the dissenters); Frank Michelman, Bush v Gore: Suspicion,
or the New Prince, 68 U Chi L Rev 679, 689 (2001) (conceding that "the Bush v. Gore
dissenters . . . . no doubt, had reasons parallel to those of the majority for preferring an
opposite electoral outcome and hence for preferring an opposite legal outcome in Bush
v Gore," but nonetheless concluding that "ft]he dissenters get an exemption because they
all maintain that the Court should have denied or dismissed the writs of certiorari in the
election cases").
" Smith, 74 Geo Wash L Rev (cited in note 8).
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That ground of distinction will not do, for at least two reasons.
First, it grossly distorts the complicated relationship between fed-
eralism and race over the course of our history. Henry Adams, for
example, wrote over a century ago that "[b]etween the slave power
and states' rights there was no necessary connection. The slave
power, when in control, was a centralizing influence, and all the
most considerable encroachments on states' rights were its acts." 8
In any event, most accept the modern nationalization of racial mat-
ters, so that current debates about state autonomy concern nonracial
questions, such as gay marriage or air pollution control.59 It is odd
to criticize doctrine driven by policy preferences on these sorts of
issues on the ground that federalism doctrine used to be driven (if
it even was) by another set of preferences entirely.
The second problem is that more favored doctrinal adventures
have also been associated with unsavory causes. How much of First
Amendment doctrine has been developed in service of pornogra-
phers and the Ku Klux Man?6° How much Eighth Amendment
doctrine has benefited brutal murderers?6 Why do we so readily
accept that a judge who allows the Nazis to march in a Jewish
community is holding his nose and acting on principle, while pre-
suming that a judge who invokes principles of federalism to shelter
a state policy is in fact embracing that policy on the merits? I submit
that it is far more plausible to view the academy as politicized on
these questions than the judges themselves. Academics criticize as
instrumentalist the decisions they do not like, and much of the
academy has little use for federalism.62 Under those circumstances,
many if not most critiques of the Court's decisions as "political"
are no more trustworthy than the opinions that they purport to
debunk.
" Henry Adams, John Randolph 178 (Peter Green, 1969) (1898). See also Lynn A. Baker
and Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L J
75, 143-49 (2001); Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution,
36 Am J Legal Hist 466 (1992).
'9 See Baker and Young, 51 Duke L J at 147-57 (cited in note 58).
60 See, e.g., Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969); Reno vACLU, 521 US 844 (1997).
61 See, e.g., Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005).
62 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 Colum L Rev 215, 290-93 (2000) (intemperately criticizing the Court's federalism
cases). Although my observation pertains primarily to legal academics, the leading pro-
ponents of the attitudinal model in political science make little attempt to hide their own
political contempt for the Rehnquist Court. See Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at
430-31 (cited in note 9).
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C. INDETERMINACY AND STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE
In order to determine the realm of judicial outcomes that are
governed by law, as opposed to politics, the political hypothesis
must draw two difficult boundary lines. One is the line between
determinacy and indeterminacy: The claim that law fails to con-
strain presupposes a definition of legal "constraint" or, conversely,
when a judge should be said to be exercising "discretion." The
second line divides political from nonpolitical arguments, so that
we can tell which arguments are driving the decisions in particular
cases. The mainstream legal literature has long recognized that
neither of these boundaries is easy to demarcate; surprisingly, pro-
ponents of the political hypothesis seem to take them almost for
granted.63
Take indeterminacy first. The attitudinalists seem to think that
law loses any constraining or directive force whenever precedents
can be cited on either side of a question. But the fact that one
can write an argument that would avoid Rule 1 1 sanctions for
either party in most Supreme Court cases hardly proves that one
side's argument is not stronger, as a matter of law, than the other
side's. It is no doubt difficult to factor the weight of precedent,
or the multifarious factors that may make one textual reading or
precedential authority more persuasive than another, into a po-
litical scientist's model. And yet eliminating these comparative
judgments from consideration will lead the attitudinalist to find
indeterminacy even in cases where most professional lawyers
would say that one answer is clearly better than the other.
The fact that reasonable professionals will disagree about the
right answer in many cases-and particularly in the atypical subset
of constitutional cases that reach the Supreme Court-hardly
proves that the Justices are unconstrained by legal principle. Judge
Posner, for example, asserts that when the Court was asked last
Term "to decide whether execution of murderers under the age
of eighteen is constitutional," the Justices were "at large. Nothing
compels a yes or no."64 I would contend, however, that both the
63 A related criticism notes that the attitudinalists' conception of"legal" decision making
is a straw man, grounded in notions of "mechanical jurisprudence" that have been out of
vogue for nearly a century. See Gillman, 13 Law & Courts at 12 (cited in note 44); Gerald
Rosenberg, Symposium on the Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 Law & Courts 3,
6-7 (Spring 1994).
'4Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 41 (cited in note 28).
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majority and the dissents in Roper v Simmons" were meaningfully
constrained by legal principle. Justice Scalia's dissent took the view
that the Court should strike only those practices disapproved by
a clear consensus of American jurisdiction, under which approach
no one could plausibly say that thirty out of fifty states amounted
to a "consensus."66 Justice O'Connor's dissent and Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion allowed a considerably greater role for
"objective" moral reasoning, but disagreed as to how that moral
calculus ought to play out.6 7 Neither disagreement-over method,
or over application-provides much comfort to attitudinalists. The
fact that the Justices disagreed over which method of legal rea-
soning to adopt does not prove that either method fails to con-
strain on its own terms; the attitudinalist would need to show
(somehow) that individual Justices shift back and forth between
different methods in different cases depending on the political
valence of the results. Nor does disagreement among Justices ap-
plying basically the same method demonstrate a lack of constraint.
One could just as well say that one of the Justices (Justice Kennedy,
in my own view) was mistaken. In any event, given the general
similarity of political outlook between Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, it would be exceptionally difficult to show that the
difference between them in Roper was a function of raw political
preferences.
The most likely answer to these arguments would raise the other
boundary question: Which arguments are "legal," and which are
"political"? One might argue, for instance, that Justice Scalia's
methodological aversion to moral argument is itself a political
preference. Judge Posner makes a similar move in his "Foreword"
when he counts as "personal or political" the methodological pref-
erence for rules over standards.68 But now everything is a "political"
preference. There is no way to distinguish, for instance, a meth-
odological preference for rules from a preference for following
precedent. At this point, of course, the attitudinal model is truly
6 543 US 551 (2005) (holding that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment).
66 Roper, 543 US at 615-18 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
67 Id at 561-64 (majority opinion); id at 590 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
68 See Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 51 (cited in note 28) (suggesting that Justice Scalia's
vote to strike down the Texas flag desecration statute is attributable to a "political" pref-
erence that "constitutional standards such as freedom of speech be recast as rules that
have very few exceptions").
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nonfalsifiable. Justices acting consistently with the legal model will
simply be satisfying their own political preference for lawlike be-
havior.6 9
It might seem more plausible to suggest that the overtly moral
arguments that moved Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in Roper
are simply political preferences. The situation is considerably more
complicated, however. Ronald Dworkin has famously argued that
the general moral commitments of a free society are part of the
legal background that must be consulted when more particular
sources of law-text, precedent, and so on-run out.7" Whatever
one thinks of that approach in general, there is some warrant for
it in the Eighth Amendment context, where both the morally
freighted text of the Constitution ("cruel and unusual") and long-
standing precedent ("evolving standards of decency") seem au-
thoritatively to incorporate moral reasoning into the relevant legal
rule. One may protest that these sorts of tests are no way to run
a legal railroad, but that-again-is a normative disagreement
about the content of the law.
General views about federalism may perform a similar function
in a case like Raich. I have argued elsewhere that a general concern
for balance between national and state power is readily identifiable
in the Constitution.71 This is a legal principle-a claim about the
meaning of the Constitution-rather than a political preference
exogenous to the case. Because the principle is general, however,
it can offer legal direction even in cases where the immediate
sources-constitutional text, direct precedent-run out.72 As I dis-
cuss in Part II, the text of the Commerce Clause and the existing
precedent would have permitted-but did not dictate-a more
restrictive approach to Congress's commerce power. To the extent
that the balance of power in twenty-first-century America has
shifted in favor of the national power, the constitutional principle
69Judge Posner offers another avenue of nonfalsifiability when he hypothesizes that
"voting against one's seeming druthers may be a calculation that the appearance of being
'principled' is rhetorically and politically effective. It fools people." Id at 51-52. Now any
judicial behavior contrary to the attitudinal model can be written off as subterfuge, un-
dertaken to set up some future opportunity to behave politically. This may, of course,
describe how judges in fact behave (at least sometimes). But the possibility makes it
impossible to disprove the assertion that politics is at the root of every decision.
70 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv L Rev 1057 (1975).
7 See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine at 1764-75 (cited in note 19).
72 See id at 1775-99; Ernest A. Young, Alden v Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure,
41 Wm & Mary L Rev 1601, 1638-51 (2000).
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of balance would have supported this more restrictive tack. On
the other hand, if one interprets the Constitution as a fundamen-
tally nationalizing document,73 then that interpretation would sup-
port the approach taken by the Raich majority. The important
point for present purposes is simply that these are contending
views about the law, not simply political preferences.
A final point about the preferences commonly imputed to the
Justices by proponents of the political hypothesis: Why would one
assume that the Justices place no value on the development of-
and adherence to-a coherent set of legal rules? Political scientists
in the interpretivist tradition have suggested that "justices acquire
distinctive preferences, goals, or conceptions of duty by virtue of
their understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in the po-
litical system," and that "the justices' concern about the mainte-
nance of the institution's power and legitimacy mitigates their
temptation to indulge their personal points of view."74 Surely every
constitutional lawyer has wrestled with the need to maintain some
coherent distinction between law and politics, and one would think
that this distinction might well be even more central to the pro-
fessional identity of those lawyers serving as Supreme Court
Justices. This "preference for law" may well be overridden in some
cases, but why would one assume that it would always lose out to
some marginal result-oriented preference having to do with, say,
the implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?7 5
For the attitudinalists, analyzing a Supreme Court decision like
Raich in terms of its articulated legal reasoning requires "the fat-
uousness characteristic of Pollyanna."76 Belief in the constraining
force of law is an "unsophisticated view"; in truth, "the legal model
and its components serve only to rationalize the Court's decisions
and to cloak the reality of the Court's decision-making process."77
7 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States (Cambridge, 2005).
7 Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Insti-
tutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-
Making at 65, 77 (cited in note 27).
"s See Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act could not overcome the states' sovereign immunity).
7 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court at 1 (cited in note 9); but see Cross, 74 NYU
L Rev at 1313 (cited in note 10) (advancing a more modest version of the political hy-
pothesis and conceding that "[t]he law can and does constrain opinions to a degree").
" Id at 6, 53. Although I have cited Judge Posner as the most prominent recent pro-
ponent of the political hypothesis among legal academics, he does not go nearly so far:
His claim that law fails to constrain is limited to constitutional decisions by the Supreme
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But like most categorical claims in a complex world, this claim is
wrong: Politics surely enters into Supreme Court decisions, but
it is hardly the whole story. Neither the federalism cases in general,
nor the Raich decision in particular, bears out the claim that the
Court's decisions are driven by result-oriented political prefer-
ences.
II. A BAD DAY FOR STATE AUTONOMY
The more interesting questions in Raich were doctrinal.
The first two arose out of the fact that the federal Controlled
Substances Act was a major federal statute governing a large class
of activity. This gave rise to a problem of characterization: Is the
"regulated activity"-which must be commercial under Lopez-
the marijuana market generally? Or is it the medicinal use by
people who grow it themselves in California? The second question
arises if the latter characterization is accepted: To what extent can
non-commercial activity be regulated as a "necessary and proper"
means of facilitating a scheme of commercial regulation? Justice
Stevens's majority opinion resolved the case by opting for a broad
view of the relevant regulated activity. Justice Scalia's concurrence,
by contrast, decided the case on "necessary and proper" grounds.
These two doctrinal approaches seem likely to remain the primary
battlegrounds in future Commerce Clause decisions.78
The third and more general question arises from the presence
of a state regulatory regime dealing with the same subject matter
as the federal one. Should this matter? Most efforts to articulate
the values served by federalism, after all, stress the importance of
allowing state governments to make their own distinctive policy
choices. From that perspective, Raich was a far more important
case than Lopez and Morrison, in which the states had not under-
taken to dissent from federal policy. Given the structure of the
Supremacy Clause, however, it is difficult to give weight to state
policy judgments when they come into conflict with federal man-
dates. The facts of Raich offered some possible avenues for re-
Court. See Posner, 119 Harv L Rev at 40-41 (cited in note 28). But within that sphere,
it is not easy to see where he differs from the attitudinalists in political science.
" See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev 743,
744-50 (2005) (offering an array of doctrinal strategies for limiting Raich along these two
doctrinal lines).
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specting state policy divergence, but the Court largely ignored
them.
A. THE CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEM AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
Lopez and Morrison suggested that the key question in Com-
merce Clause cases is whether the activity that Congress has
sought to regulate is "commercial" or "economic" in nature. Gen-
erally speaking, Congress may regulate items or persons in inter-
state commerce, the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or activities with "substantial effects" on interstate
commerce.79 The third category has traditionally been the most
capacious, especially in light of the Court's holding in Wickard v
Filburn that "substantial effects" must be assessed in the aggre-
gate."o For example, the fact that the sale of a single stick of
bubblegum has no appreciable effect on the national economy
matters little, since the aggregate impact of all bubblegum sales
is much more substantial.8 The Court limited this aggregation
principle in Lopez and Morrison, however, by insisting that it ap-
plied only when the regulated activity is itself commercial or eco-
nomic in nature. 2 Most cases are thus likely to turn on the char-
acter of the regulated activity.
The Court had little trouble with this question in Lopez and
Morrison: It found, without a great deal of disagreement on the
point from the dissenters, that neither possessing a gun nor as-
saulting a woman is a commercial act.83 The issue was considerably
more difficult in Raich, however. The plaintiffs argued that their
marijuana use was plainly noncommercial: They cultivated their
marijuana themselves, so that it was neither bought nor sold-nor
carried across state lines. They were thus not participants in any
economic market for marijuana.84 The U.S. government, on the
other hand, insisted that the relevant activity was marijuana use
in general, which generally does involve a purchase and sale and
9 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 US at 558-59.
80317 US 111, 127-28 (1942).
8 See Datamonitor, Gum Confectionery in the United States at 9 (Feb 2004) (reporting
that the value of the U.S. gum confectionery market was $2.296 billion).
02 See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 613 (2000); Lopez, 514 US at 560.
8 See Morrison, 529 US at 613; Lopez, 514 US at 561.
14 See Brief for Respondents in No 03-1454, Gonzales v Raich, at 23-27.
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is thus clearly commercial in nature.85 These divergent charac-
terizations were reflected in the respective statutory schemes. The
federal scheme regulated marijuana use generally, while the state
regulatory regime sought to carve out a narrow class of purely
medicinal, homegrown consumption.86
The characterization problem in Raich was reminiscent of the
classic "level of generality" problem arising in the definition of
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause.87 Neither the
Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause says anything about
the appropriate level of generality at which to analyze any given
activity, and the manipulability of this choice generates both un-
predictability and the potential for result-oriented decisions. The
Raich majority sought to avoid these pitfalls by deferring to Con-
gress's choice of the appropriate level of generality. Because the
Controlled Substances Act regulated marijuana use generally, the
Court rejected California's attempt to carve out a particular subset
of that activity for distinctive treatment.88
This approach avoided the need for the Court to choose for
itself the level of generality at which to characterize the regulated
activity. There are several problems, however. One is that the
Court may, in fact, have misconstrued Congress's choice. The
question is whether medicinal use of marijuana is sufficiently dis-
tinct from ordinary recreational use as to constitute a separate
activity for regulatory purposes. The structure of the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act suggests that medicinal uses are distinctive,
and it regulates them separately under Schedules II through V of
the Act.89 Federal authorities have determined, of course, that
marijuana is a drug without any legitimate medical use, but that
determination is irrelevant to whether medical uses-where they
s See Brief for Petitioner in No 03-1454, Gonzales v Raich, at 40 ("For purposes of
defining Congress's power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the CSA, . . . there
is no basis for distinguishing marijuana production, distribution, or use for purported
medicinal purposes, as opposed to recreational (or any other) purpose.").
86 Compare Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal Health & Safety Code § 11362.5, with
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC § 844(a). The CSA does expressly disclaim intent
"to ... exclu[de] any State law on the same subject matter . . . unless there is a positive
conflict" such that the federal and state laws "cannot consistently stand together." 21 USC
§ 903.
" See generally Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U Chi L Rev 1057 (1990).
8 See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2211-13.
9 See 21 USC §§ 821-29; Scholars' Brief at 17-18 (cited in "Author's note").
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are thought to exist-are sufficiently distinct from recreational
uses to require separate regulatory treatment. On that question,
Congress and California were in agreement, and the Court ar-
guably should have deferred to that judgment by analyzing medical
use as a distinct class of regulated activity for Commerce Clause
purposes.
More fundamentally, a policy of deferring to Congress's choice
of the appropriate level of generality makes Congress the judge
of its own power. As the Raich dissenters recognized,9" Congress
can choose how generally to regulate, and under the majority's
approach Congress can leverage a dubious regulation of noncom-
mercial activity simply by casting the regulatory net more broadly.
A narrow regulation of the content of high school science text-
books, for example, might not hold up as "commercial" under
Lopez, but Congress could overcome this barrier by enacting a
more comprehensive scheme regulating the purchase and sale of
textbooks generally. Adrian Vermeule has argued that this sort of
perverse incentive is endemic to the Court's Commerce Clause
doctrine.91 It is inevitable, however, only if the Court refuses to
analyze whether particular subsets of activity are "commercial"
notwithstanding the more general scope of Congress's regulatory
scheme.
One escape from this dilemma would be through the Court's
doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges. If the Court permitted
as-applied challenges, then the constitutionality of federal regu-
lation could be framed by the activity at issue in the particular
case. Angel Raich used marijuana that she had grown herself for
purely medicinal purposes; she did not buy, sell, or take the stuff
across state lines. A traditional as-applied challenge would ask
whether her activity was commercial. Hence, her brief began its
discussion of the relevant class of conduct in the case by insisting
that "Respondents are not challenging the constitutionality of the
CSA on its face but only as it applies to the class of activities in
90 See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2222 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("[A]llowing Congress to set
the terms of the constitutional debate in this way, i.e., by packaging regulation of local
activity in broader schemes, is tantamount to removing meaningful limits on the Com-
merce Clause.").
"1 Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 Viii L Rev
1325, 1333-36 (2001) (noting that because the Court permits regulation of noncommercial
activity where such regulation is part of a "comprehensive scheme," the Lopez doctrine
may encourage Congress to draft broader regulatory schemes to the detriment of the
States).
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which they are engaged."92 Under this approach, the Court would
not "choose" a level of generality, but rather accept the case as
defined by the litigants. This is how most constitutional litigation
proceeds.93
Assessing federal statutes as applied to particular plaintiffs
would, of course, push in the direction of narrower frames, with
the result that federal regulation would be more likely to be found
unconstitutional in particular cases. That does not mean the courts
would strike down federal law in many cases-the Court's defi-
nition of commercial activity remains extremely capacious,94 and
the' government would retain the option of arguing that sweeping
in subclasses of noncommercial activity is "necessary and proper"
to fulfill the legitimate commercial goals of the statutory scheme.9"
Moreover, the as-applied nature of the challenge inherently lowers
the stakes by permitting the federal regulation in question to con-
tinue to be applied to those instances of the regulated activity that
are commercial in nature. The Raich majority squarely rejected
this sort of analysis, however, and refused to permit constitutional
challenges to carve out noncommercial instances of an activity
from a broader regulation covering commercial and noncommer-
cial instances alike.96
The Court's rejection of as-applied challenges in Raich is odd,
given its stated strong preference for as-applied challenges in other
areas.97 It is even odder in light of the Court's recent decision in
Tennessee v Lane,9" in which the Justices in the Raich majority es-
92 Respondents' Brief at 19 (cited in note 84).
The question how to define the activity at issue in a particular case is distinct from
the generality issue involved in identifying protected individual rights. See generally Mi-
chael H. v Gerald D., 491 US 110, 127 n 6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J). In Bowers v
Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986), for example, one might have defined the regulated activity
as "homosexual sodomy" because that is what the particular plaintiff had done, while still
arguing that the interpretive question is whether the Constitution protects a more general
right of sexual privacy.
See Young, Two Federalisms at 135-37 (cited in note 13).
I assess these sorts of arguments-which I believe provided the more persuasive ground
for sustaining the statute in Raich-in the next section.
96 See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2211-13.
9' See, e.g., United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid."); Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 52-53 (1971). For a particularly lucid discussion
of the Court's use of facial and as-applied analysis in federalism cases, see Gillian E.
Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 Colum L Rev 873 (2005).
9 124 S Ct 1978 (2004).
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sentially considered the ADA as applied to courthouse access cases,
while refusing to evaluate whether the statute would be a valid
exercise of the Section 5 power considered across the whole range
of its applications.99 Lane, however, was itself a departure from
previous federalism cases that had tended to evaluate the full sweep
of a statute rather than its application to individual instances. In
City of Boerne v Flores,°° for example, the Court's "congruence
and proportionality" analysis focused on the entire sweep of the
statute in question, not on its application to a particular plaintiff
or even to a subclass of cases.
The use of facial analysis in Section 5 cases, however, has prop-
erly been influenced-at least implicitly-by the peculiar office of
Section 5 as a vehicle for the legislative enforcement of consti-
tutional rights. The worry in Boerne and its progeny is that Con-
gress will use Section 5 to change the content of rights rather
than simply to enforce them. This concern must be balanced,
however, with deference to the institutional advantages that Con-
gress enjoys with respect to enforcing rights in particular situa-
tions.101 Because of its different fact-finding mechanisms, for ex-
ample, Congress may be better at identifying practices that derive
from unconstitutional discriminatory intent, even though they are
facially neutral in form.1"2 The doctrine has thus allowed Congress
to act "prophylactically" by barring practices-such as a literacy
test for voting-that it views as unconstitutional notwithstanding
that a court would be unwilling to find the same practice uncon-
stitutional. °3 The trick, of course, is to distinguish between cases
"9 Lane did not pursue a "pure" as-applied analysis because it did not ask whether the
states' failure to provide access to the particular disabled plaintiffs in the case was un-
constitutional; rather, it took a broad statute (requiring disabled access to public accom-
modations generally) and identified a much narrower subset of cases (those involving access
to courthouses). It then assessed the constitutionality of the ADA as applied to this subset
of cases. That, however, is a far cry from the ordinary facial challenge, which would have
assessed the statute's entire range of applications.
100 521 US 507, 532-33 (1997); see also Metzger, 105 Column L Rev at 894-97 (cited
in note 97) (discussing the use of facial analysis in Section 5 cases).
"' Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212 (1978); Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right with Standard
of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, 46 Vill L Rev 1091 (2001).
12 See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 654-56 (1966) (noting Congress's "specially
informed legislative competence" in identifying invidious discrimination).
03 Compare Lassiter v Northampton Cty Bd of Elections, 360 US 45 (1959) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to literacy tests for voting), with Morgan, 384 US at 649 (framing
the relevant question as, "Without regard to whether the judiciary would find that the
[2005
JUST BLOWING SMOKE? 27
in which Congress is prophylactically enforcing the same consti-
tutional principle as the Court has recognized, and cases in which
Congress is trying to overrule the Court's interpretations and
change the Constitution without going through the amendment
process (as the Court thought it was in Boerne)."°4 This is where
facial analysis comes in: The Court looks to the entire sweep of
the statute-not just its application in a particular case-to de-
termine whether Congress has generally tried to conform the
shape of its legislation to the constitutional principle recognized
by the Court. If that is the case, then the fact that the statute may
reach conduct that would not be unconstitutional in a particular
case is not fatal.
The fact that Congress is enforcing rights grounded in the Con-
stitution also explains, in my view, the departure from ordinary
facial analysis in Lane. The Americans with Disability Act is gen-
erally considered an equality statute, enforcing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. The problem then is that disability is not a suspect
class, so that broad statutory prohibitions of discrimination based
on disability are likely to prohibit far more conduct than would
the Constitution itself.'15 But in Lane, an additional constitutional
right was at stake: the right, grounded in the Due Process Clause,
of access to courts.' °6 The subset of ADA cases that the Court
analyzed in Lane was thus carved out by the Constitution itself,
rather than arbitrarily chosen by the majority Justices. Surely it
makes sense to analyze the propriety of congressional enforcement
of a right with particular regard to cases implicating that right.0 7
Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so
applied, could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?").
041 take no position here on whether Congress ought to be able to enforce a different
interpretation of the Constitution than that which the Court would accept. Current case
law says Congress may not, and my subject here is how the Court enforces that principle
by use of facial analysis of Congress's statutes.
"' See City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 US 432, 442-47 (1985) (refusing to
recognize the disabled as a suspect class); Bd of Trs of the Univ. of Alabama v Garrett, 531
US 356, 374 (2001) (emphasizing the absence of heightened scrutiny in holding thatTitle
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not a valid use of the Section 5 power).
106 See, e.g., Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819 n 15 (1975) (recognizing a criminal
defendant's "right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate
the fairness of the proceedings"); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court, 478 US 1,
8 (1986) (recognizing the public's "First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings").
107 Cf. Metzger, 105 Colum L Rev at 931-32 (cited in note 97) (concluding that Lane
properly applied ordinary rules of severability in holding that Title II of the ADA could
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The point of this side trip through the Section 5 cases is to
show that the considerations governing the use of facial or as-
applied analysis in these cases are unique to Section 5. The com-
merce power, by contrast, is not delimited by principles found
elsewhere in the Constitution; the question is simply what counts
as "commerce among the several states." As-applied analysis would
help to manage the otherwise intractable problem of defining the
appropriate level of generality in Commerce Clause cases; the fact
that such analysis is used differently in Section 5 cases is interesting
but hardly dispositive.' ° Problems would remain, of course. As
Gillian Metzger has suggested, an as-applied challenge may define
the relevant class of activity "so narrowly as to not fairly constitute
a discrete class."' °9 But that risk evaporates in cases like Raich where
both state and federal authorities have chosen to treat medical uses
of a substance differently from other uses. In any event, the al-
ternative-allowing Congress's choice to legislate generally to
sweep in all sorts of noncommercial subclasses of activity-simply
does too little to maintain balance between federal and state au-
thority.
B. FALSE NECESSITY
The second important set of doctrinal issues has to do with
Congress's authority to regulate noncommercial activities under
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Scalia's concurring opin-
ion in Raich avoided the need to resolve the level of generality
problem discussed in the last section by assuming, at least for the
sake of argument, that the more narrow frame was appropriate.
He thus conceded that, as in Lopez and Morrison, the regulated
activity was noncommercial in nature."' But this did not auto-
at least be upheld as applied to court access cases). The Court very recently adhered to
this approach in United States v Georgia, 2006 US LEXIS 759 (Jan 10, 2006), which upheld,
as applied to persons alleging actual constitutional violations, the abrogration of state
sovereign immunity in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Sam Bagenstos,
Court Decides US/Goodman v. Georgia, Disability Law (Jan 10, 2006) (available at http://
disabilitylaw.blogspot.com/2006/01/court-decides-usgoodman-v-georgia.html) (observing
that "[t]he Court's decision .. .made clear that the as-applied analysis in Tennessee v.
Lane was not a sport").
108 See Metzger, 105 Colum L Rev at 930 (cited in note 97) (concluding that "as-applied
challenges generally remain available in the commerce power context"); Barnett, 9 Lewis
& Clark L Rev at 745 (cited in note 78) (concluding that as-applied challenges remain
available even after Raich).
'Metzger, 105 Colum L Rev at 929-30 (cited in note 97).
"I Raich, 125 S Ct at 2219 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment).
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matically make the regulation unconstitutional. Rather, he argued
that Congress may regulate noncommercial activity where such
regulation is "necessary and proper" to the regulation of a com-
mercial market. This argument relied heavily on dictum in Lopez
suggesting that noncommercial regulation may be appropriate if
it is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity. 1
1
Justice Scalia began by noting the broad purpose of the CSA
to "extinguish the interstate market in Schedule I controlled sub-
stances, including marijuana.""]' 2 He went on to observe that
"[d]rugs like marijuana are fungible commodities," and therefore
"marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use
is never more than an instant from the interstate market."... 3 The
government had offered several more specific arguments along
these lines in its brief. It claimed, for instance, that medical can-
nabis may substitute for other painkillers, thereby affecting the
market for those drugs." 4 It also warned that any person arrested
for marijuana possession would claim to have a medicinal pur-
pose-a contention that would have to be negated beyond a rea-
sonable doubt at trial." 5
Some of these assertions were patently implausible as justifi-
cations for enforcing the CSA against medical patients. For ex-
ample, the government's concern that medical patients allowed to
grow their own marijuana would no longer have to buy painkillers
in the ordinary commercial market-thereby affecting prices in
that market, la Wickard'16-is of course relevant only if the gov-
ernment is trying to support the price of pain-relieving drugs. But
some of the other arguments could not be so readily dismissed,
such as the concern about problems of proof in distinguishing
between medicinal and nonmedicinal users. Much thus turns upon
. Lopez, 514 US at 561. The majority likewise relied on this language, see 125 S Ct
at 2209-10, but for the different argument that one cannot carve a subset of noncommercial
activities out of a more generally defined regulatory statute.
112 Raich, 125 S Ct at 2219. In noting that "[t]he Commerce Clause unquestionably
permits this," id, Justice Scalia rejected any suggestion that a purpose to eliminate com-
merce would fall outside the Clause. I do not mean to challenge that view for purposes
of the present argument.
i1 Id.
..4 Petitioner's Brief at 26-27 (cited in note 85).
"' Id at 29-30.
.6 See Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 128 (1942).
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the standard of review for claims that noncommercial regulation
is "necessary" to facilitate commercial ends.
The leading case on the meaning of "necessary and proper" is,
of course, McCulloch v Maryland, which framed the scope of judicial
review in exceedingly deferential terms:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are consti-
tutional.'17
This standard, unfortunately, amounts to a blank check: At least
as interpreted in later cases,118 the McCulloch test requires courts
to defer to any "rational basis" for legislation-it means, in vir-
tually all cases, that Congress will be limited only by its own sense
of self-restraint. The effect of the McCulloch test in federalism
cases is thus to make the doctrine of enumerated powers dovetail
with limits imposed on all government action by substantive due
process. That hardly makes sense, given that a primary reason for
discountenancing substantive due process challenges is their ten-
uous grounding in the constitutional text and structure-a prob-
lem from which enumerated powers challenges do not suffer.119
Rational arguments of "necessity" could easily have been made
"
7 McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819).
See, e.g., Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 286 (1970) (Stewart, J, concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing McCulloch for the proposition that when Congress acts under
its Section 5 power, "as against the reserved power of the States, it is enough that the
end to which Congress has acted be one legitimately within its power and that there be
a rational basis for the measures chosen to achieve that end"); Scofield v NLRB, 393 F2d
49, 53 (7th Cir 1968) (citing McCulloch for the basic rational basis test); NLRB v Edward
G. Budd Mfg Co., 169 F2d 571, 577 (6th Cir 1948) (same); United States v Chen De Yian,
905 F Supp 160, 163 (SDNY 1995) (same).
"' Nor can equating the two sorts of challenges be grounded in long-standing practice.
The Court has manifestly not applied a rational basis test to cases testing the limits of
Congress's commerce power for much of our history. See, e.g., A.L.A. Shechter Poultry
Corp. v United States, 295 US 495 (1935) (unanimously applying a more rigorous test).
The more recent cases apply a rational basis test to Congress's judgment that a particular
activity, taken in the aggregate, will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, see
Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 US 264, 276-80 (1981), but
deference applies only to that single link in the doctrinal chain; it does not apply, for
instance, to the analytically prior question whether the regulated activity is commercial
in nature, see Lopez, 514 US at 567-68 (refusing to defer on this question). Moreover,
during the century in which the McCulloch test was formulated, its "reasonableness" review
of the relation between governmental means and ends had yet to take on the "rubber
stamp" quality that it would assume after 1937.
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in Lopez and Morrison, as the Raich dissents pointed out.12 ° The
government should have argued, for instance, that the Gun Free
School Zones Act was a necessary part of an effort to stop sales
of guns to minors. Since schools are where minors congregate,
and since it is always difficult to catch buyers and sellers in mid-
transaction, surely it would be rational to prohibit the very pos-
session of a gun at school in order to stamp out playground arms
deals. If Lopez and Morrison are to stand, in future, for anything
more than a guide to writing government briefs, then the Court
is going to have to limit its deference to such arguments.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Raich was ambiguous on the ex-
tent to which the Court should be prepared to look behind the
government's assertions and determine for itself whether any given
noncommercial regulation is "necessary" to a broader scheme of
commercial regulation. I have argued elsewhere that a McCulloch
standard for implied powers, developed at a time when the express
powers of Congress were interpreted quite narrowly, may make
little sense under modern conditions.12" ' Any attempt to tighten
the standard of review, however, is likely to raise all the old con-
cerns about second-guessing the policy judgments behind legis-
lation that led to the repudiation of the Lochner-era jurispru-
dence.122 And the inevitable inconsistencies that would arise in the
application of an open-ended standard in this area will only worsen
the criticisms, discussed in Part I of this essay, that the Court's
federalism jurisprudence is political or instrumental. 23
There are, however, at least two ways out of this dilemma. One
is by way of clear statement: If Congress is to invoke the Necessary
and Proper Clause in this potentially unlimited fashion, then at
least Congress should make the judgment of necessity. This would
substitute a process-based limit, derived from both the represen-
20 See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2223 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
22 See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine at 1754 (cited in note 19). McCulloch also
presupposed that some review would be available to foreclose Congress's use of the com-
merce power as apretext for noncommercial ends. See 4 Wheat at 422 ("[Slhould Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should
a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law
of the land."). But that motive-based limit has been dead ever since the Court overruled
Hammer v Dagenhart. See United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 116-17 (1941).
122 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 US at 604-09, 614-15 (Souter, J, dissenting) (raising this worry).
23 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Supreme
Court Review 125, 170-75; Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1836-40 (cited in note 19).
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tation of the states in Congress and the procedural difficulties of
federal lawmaking, for a substantive one.'24 In Raich, the only gov-
ernmental necessity judgment consisted of an argument in a brief
submitted by the Justice Department.'s Insisting on a clear state-
ment of Congress's intent, then, would have preserved the states'
autonomy on the matter unless and until Congress could overcome
the ordinary inertial barriers attendant on legislation and revisit
the issue.
The other option would involve giving weight to the judgment
of the state legislature-like Congress, a democratically account-
able institution-that measures incorporated in the state scheme
could minimize any detrimental impact on federal regulation of
nonmedicinal uses. The rational basis test derived from McCulloch
has its impetus in the institutional advantages that legislative bod-
ies enjoy over courts-primarily in terms of democratic legit-
imacy, but also sometimes based on fact-finding capacity and
policy-making expertise."' A case like Raich, however, involves not
one legislature but two. If the Court is looking for a legislature to
defer to, it could choose to defer to California's judgment that a
limited class of medicinal users may be carved out from the general
prohibition on marijuana without unduly undermining the overall
regulatory scheme. The Supremacy Clause does not make Con-
gress's judgments any wiser or more legitimate than a state legis-
lature's, and those are the criteria of deference when a court is asked
to assess the limits of lawmaking authority. In assessing whether
Congressional legislation is enacted "pursuant to this Constitution"
so as to trigger the Supremacy Clause, there is no a priori reason
that a modest Court should not defer to the state legislature's judg-
ments rather than to Congress's.
This last argument raises a broader question: To what extent
should it matter, when assessing the limits of Congress's power,
that a state legislature has chosen to approach a particular policy
issue in a way that deviates from the federal program? Although I
have suggested that Raich raised complex variations on the tests
adopted in Lopez and Morrison, it was this added element of state
policy divergence that made the case truly distinct from what had
"' See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 17 (cited in note 13) (discussing the effects of clear
statement rules).
25 See Petitioner's Brief at 22-35 (cited in note 85).
26 See Hart, 46 ViII L Rev at 1104-05 (cited in note 101).
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come before.' 27 The Court's approach to this element, however,
offered little ground for optimism that its federalism jurisprudence
will evolve in a direction that would truly respect the valuable as-
pects of state autonomy.
C. DOES STATE REGULATION MATTER?
Defenders of federalism from a policy standpoint tend to stress
the value of having state governments adopt and implement pol-
icies that diverge from one another and from the national gov-
ernment. Such divergence is a precondition of state experimen-
tation and accommodation of diverse preferences.' 28 It underlies
values of political participation at the state level: What good is
political participation, after all, if participants are not free to pur-
sue their own policy agendas? '29 And policy autonomy powers what
is, in my view, the most plausible account of how state governments
foster liberty. On that account, state governments prevent the
entrenchment of elites at the national level by providing a place
where parties that are out of power at the center can nonetheless
pursue their own policy agendas. Successes at the state level then
allow these "out" parties to present themselves as plausible and
competent alternatives in national elections.'30 None of this works,
however, unless state governments have the freedom to go their
own way on at least some issues of significance.' 3 '
Given the centrality of state policy autonomy to theoretical
accounts of federalism, it is somewhat surprising that Raich was
the first of the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause trilogy to
involve a serious difference of opinion over policy between the
national government and a state government. The federal regu-
lation in Lopez was completely redundant with state laws barring
"'The same element figured prominently in Gonzales v Oregon, 126 S Ct 904 (2006)
(deciding whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to preempt Oregon's
physician-assisted suicide law).
128 See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 53-58 (cited in note 13).
129 See id at 58-63.
130 See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Embrace Federalism in the
Wake of the War on Terror, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1277, 1286-87 (2004). For a similar view,
see Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan L Rev 1745, 1759-69 (2005).
"' See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 63-65 (cited in note 13); see also Todd E. Pettys,
Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 Vand L Rev 329
(2003).
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guns in schools. 13 2 And no one seriously thinks that the states were
"pro-violence" or "anti-woman" in Morrison; indeed, thirty-six
states filed an amicus brief supporting the VAWA's constitution-
ality.'33 If the point of federalism is to facilitate diverse regulatory
regimes or state-by-state experimentation, then neither Lopez nor
Morrison did much in furtherance of those goals. Raich, however,
involved a state regulatory experiment reflecting a substantial di-
vergence between the views of the state population and that of
the nation as a whole.
The Court's majority, however, did not care. For them, the only
question in the case was whether the law fell within Congress's
enumerated power under Article I. The existence or nonexistence
of a state regulatory scheme was completely irrelevant to this ques-
tion: "Just as state acquiescence to federal regulation cannot ex-
pand the bounds of the Commerce Clause,. . . so too state action
cannot circumscribe Congress' plenary commerce power."' 34 This
position is plausible in light of the structure of Article I and the
Supremacy Clause. Federal law is supreme so long as it is grounded
in the enumerated powers, and the supremacy effect of such law
extends from the most weighty to the most trivial enactments.
The text makes no allowance, for example, for weighing the im-
portance of a state policy against a federal law provision that pur-
ports to trump it.'35 It was thus surely intelligible, under the cur-
rent doctrine, to view the contours of California's regulatory
program as irrelevant to the issue in Raich.
132 Lopez, 514 US at 581 ("Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing
the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.").
"' Brief of the States of Arizona et al in Support of Petitioner in Nos 99-5, 99-29,
United States v Morrison and Brzonkala v Morrison (filed Nov 12, 1999) (available at 1999
US S Ct Briefs, LEXIS 219); see also Morrison, 529 US at 653 ("The National Association
of Attorneys General supported the Act unanimously. . . and Attorneys General from 38
States urged Congress to enact the Civil Rights Remedy, representing that 'the current
system for dealing with violence against women is inadequate ... "').
"' 125 S Ct at 2213. The Court cited a variety of prior statements to the same effect.
United States v Darby, for example, insisted that the commerce power "can neither be
enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." 312 US 100, 114
(1941). And Wickard said that "no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the
regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress." 317 US at 124.
"' See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2212 ("It is beyond peradventure that federal power over
commerce is 'superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of
their inhabitants,' however legitimate or dire those necessities may be.") (quoting Maryland
v Wirtz, 392 US 183, 196 (1968)); Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny of Con-
gressional Power When the States Undertake Policy Erperiments? 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev 779,
781 (2005) ("A federal law, however crude, trumps conflicting state law, no matter how
carefully conceived and magnificently beneficial the state's policy experiment may be.").
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I want to argue, however, that this view was mistaken. For one
thing, it is surely ironic to hear those who have argued for the
dramatic expansion of national power in the twentieth century as
a necessary response to the practical necessities of modern gov-
ernance suddenly become formalists when it comes to the Su-
premacy Clause.' 36 If American federalism is to take account of
modern institutional realities, then the development of state gov-
ernments into large, sophisticated, and competent regulatory en-
tities in their own right ought surely to be one of those realities.
The critics of the Court's more formal doctrines are right when
they say that federalism is a practical conception. To ignore the
existence and activity of one of the world's largest regulatory ju-
risdictions-the great State of California37-is to blink functional
reality in the worst possible way. One would have thought we were
past the day when Justices could assert that state governmental
authority "does not exist." '38
Ann Althouse has worried that taking state regulation into ac-
count "would invite fifty states and innumerable cities to carve out
exceptions of all sorts from important federal statutes that are
unquestionably supported by the Commerce Clause."' 39 But one
need not propose some amorphous and open-ended balancing of
state and federal interests to take state regulation into account.
Doctrinally, recognition of the existence and capacity of state gov-
ernments can and should occur through the "necessary and
proper" analysis that considers when Congress may regulate mat-
ter outside the Commerce Clause in order to further a scheme of
commercial regulation. It is one thing to say that any outright
36 See, e.g., Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 941 (1997) (Stevens, J, dissenting)
(arguing that federal commandeering of state officials is a necessary and practical response
to modern crises). Critics of the Federalist Revival love to lambaste the Court for its
excessive formalism. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Seth E Kreimer, The New Etiquette
of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Supreme Court Review 71 ("The juris-
prudence of federalism has been bedecked with formalistic distinctions .... "). For a
convincing rebuttal, see Allison Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 Wm & Mary B of Rts
J 1191 (2003).
131 If California were an independent nation, its economy (with a gross state product of
$1.5 trillion in 2004) would rank somewhere between fourth and tenth largest in the
world. See "Economy of California" in Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Economy-o California.
131 United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937) (asserting that state authority is
irrelevant "[i]n respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of
our foreign relations generally").
'
39 Althouse, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 789 (cited in note 135).
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regulation of commercial activity is permissible, regardless of the
presence or absence of state regulation. But it is quite another to
say that state regulatory schemes are irrelevant to what federal
measures are necessary under the "Sweeping Clause." "Necessity,"
after all, is a practical rather than a formal conception. Federal
action may well be necessary when failure to act would leave a
regulatory void; it may well be less necessary when state regulation
is taken into account.
Consider, for example, the government's argument in Raich that
the existence of any legal category of marijuana consumption
would create daunting problems of proof in prosecutions of non-
medicinal users. 4 ° Anyone arrested for recreational consumption
would, of course, plead that they reserved their marijuana for
"medicinal purposes," and federal prosecutors would have to ne-
gate this contention beyond a reasonable doubt. That seems like
a pretty compelling argument, but it changes considerably when
the state regulatory regime is added to the picture. Under that
scheme, California provided authorized medicinal users with an
optional ID card clearly stating that they were entitled to use
marijuana under the state law scheme.14" ' Persons arrested for rec-
reational use would either have such a card or they would not.
While more marginal proof issues might remain, the California
scheme cuts substantially into the federal government's case for
extending their scheme of regulation to noncommercial activity.142
On these sorts of practical questions, the contours of state reg-
ulation ought to make a difference.
The majority opinion's insistence on the irrelevance of state
regulation is particular depressing in light of its author. I have
argued elsewhere that the Court's four putative "nationalists"-
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-actually harbor a
meaningful conception of federalism that stresses the value of state
regulatory autonomy.'43 Justice Stevens, in particular, has been
willing to defend the authority of state governments to enact and
implement their own policies in cases involving the preemption
10 Petitioner's Brief at 30 (cited in note 85).
... Cal Health & Safety Code §§ 11362.7-11362.83 (2003).
42 See Respondents' Brief at 38-39 (cited in note 84); Scholars' Brief at 28-29 (cited
in "Author's note").
113 See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 41-45 (cited in note 13).
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of state regulation by federal law.1"4 As Raich demonstrates, these
same values are at stake in cases about the constitutional scope of
Congress's regulatory authority; Congress cannot preempt state
law, after all, unless it has the authority to act in the first place.
The Court's four liberals remain allergic to any suggestion that
federalism is enforceable as a matter of constitutional principle,
and yet it is hard to see how state regulatory autonomy can remain
secure without some hard limit on Congress's power.
III. WORSE DAYS AHEAD?
Many observers will view Raich as the end of the Rehnquist
Court's "Federalist Revival," especially when one sees it in con-
junction with the Court's recent retreat in several important Elev-
enth Amendment cases.145 Others will note the importance of the
Controlled Substances Act and its clear range of constitutional
applications, as well as the relative care with which the Raich ma-
jority analyzed its commercial impact, as evidence that the Court's
jurisprudence is now "normalizing" or moderating; in a mature
and meaningful Commerce Clause jurisprudence, after all, we
would expect to see cases coming down on both sides of the line.
This last section will try to read some tea leaves.
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S QUESTION
At the oral argument in Lopez, Justice O'Connor asked Solicitor
General Drew Days to tell her, if the Gun Free Zones Act was
within the Commerce Power, what conceivable federal law would
not be constitutional.'46 The transcript indicates that General Days
144 See, e.g., Geier v American Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J,
dissenting); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 US 525, 590 (2001) (Stevens, J, dissenting).
14' See Nevada Dept of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721 (2003) (upholding abrogation
of state sovereign immunity in the Family Medical Leave Act); Tennessee v Lane, 541 US
509 (2004) (upholding abrogation of state sovereign immunity in Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act for plaintiffs denied access to the courts); United States v Georgia,
2006 US LEXIS 759 (Jan 10, 2006) (upholding abrogation of state sovereign immunity
in Title II of the ADA for plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations); Central Virginia
Community College v Katz, 2006 US LEXIS 917 (Jan 23, 2006) (upholding abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code).
"4 Oral Argument in United States v Lopez, No 93-1260, 1994 US Trans LEXIS 107,
at *4 ("If this is covered, what's left of enumerated powers? What is there that Congress
could not do, under this rubric, if you are correct?").
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had no answer to that question.'4 7 Not surprisingly, the majority
opinions in both Lopez and Morrison stressed that, if the respective
statutes in those cases were upheld, the Court would be left with
no limiting principle for federal power at all. 4 '
One can make the case that Raich presented the same situation.
The dissenters argued with considerable force that the doctrinal
moves made to uphold the Controlled Substances Act could also
have been applied to uphold the Gun Free School Zones Act and
the private right of action provision of the Violence Against
Women Act.'49 Randy Barnett, who argued the case for Angel
Raich, predicted afterwards that "[t]here will never be another
successful Commerce Clause challenge to a federal statute in the
Courts of Appeals if the Supreme Court accepts EITHER of the
government's two theories."' 5° My own view, however, is that the
Court's back was not to the wall in the sense that it was in Lopez
and Morrison. One can identify plausible federal statutes-for in-
stance, a federal statute banning gay marriage-that would be ex-
ceptionally hard to justify on any of the theories offered in Raich.
My choice of gay marriage as an example is not simply an effort
to tweak liberal assumptions (as fun as that is). Two aspects of gay
marriage are important in this context: First, it is not a subset of
147 See id at *4-5:
General Days: Well, Your Honor, I'm not prepared to speculate generally, but
this Court has found that Congress, for example, in New York v. United States
could not regulate-could not require New York State to carry out certain re-
sponsibilities, because it was commandeering the instrumentalities of the State.
Justice O'Connor was unsatisfied by this reference to the anti-commandeering doctrine:
Question: Well, the objection there was that it was objecting the State govern-
mental machinery to operate in a certain way. The question here, it seems to
me, is quite different. The question here is the universe of transactions that the
Congress may reach.
Id at *5. No example of a transaction that Congress may not reach was offered by the
government.
"' See Lopez, 514 US at 564 ("[11f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate."); Morrison, 529 US at 615-17.
"' See Raich, 125 S Ct at 2226 (O'Connor dissenting); see also Scholars' Brief at 23-25
(cited in "Author's note").
IS Randy Barnett, Adler on Importance to Federalism of Raich v Ashcroft, The Volokh
Conspiracy (Dec 1, 2004), available at http://volokh.com/posts/l101916887.shtml. Pro-
fessor Barnett's more recent assessment seems somewhat less dire. See Barnett, 9 Lewis
& Clark L Rev at 750 (cited in note 78) (predicting that, in the future, "the 'doctrine'
established by the Court in Raich will seem remarkably narrow, fragile, and easy to dis-
tinguish or subtly modify").
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a larger class of activity that seems plausibly commercial, as med-
ical marijuana use is a subset of a larger market in illicit drugs.
Second, a federal statute banning gay marriage would stand largely
alone, unattached to any comprehensive federal marriage scheme.
Perhaps Congress could assert sufficient links to the interstate
economy to support such a scheme under the Commerce Power.
(Anyone who has ever paid for a wedding has experienced the
multiplier effect of a marriage vow on the market for goods and
services.) But the political checks on comprehensive national reg-
ulation of marriage and family structure seem very strong.
The message of Raich may be that when Congress enters a
regulatory field in a comprehensive way-for example, federal
drug regulation-its incursion will be upheld, but that isolated
regulations of noncommercial acts will not be. That would leave
us with little hard limit on Congress's power, but the same rule
would effectively multiply political checks on national action. The
most formidable "political safeguard of federalism," after all, is
opposition on the merits to any particular federal proposal; by
foreclosing Congress from legislating narrowly, the likelihood and
ferocity of political opposition to any given proposal should in-
crease."5 ' These dynamics will only increase in importance as the
culture wars heat up. By impeding Congress's ability to single out
particular practices for federal disapproval in areas otherwise left
to state regulation, even the narrow limit described here would
promote state-by-state experimentation and accommodation of di-
vergent preferences. It is surely important that Congress lacks
power to impose a national solution to current debates about mar-
riage and similar issues.
Notwithstanding this silver lining, Raich most likely marks the
outer bound of the Court's ambition in Commerce Clause cases.
Apocalyptic predictions notwithstanding, l"2 many of us have long
argued that the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence was pri-
marily symbolic in its importance and unlikely to go far. 5 ' A roll-
1s, See, e.g., Althouse, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 789 (cited in note 135) (suggesting
that it would have been politically difficult for Congress to legislate more broadly in
Lopez).
"5 See, e.g., Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the Future Constitutional Crisis, 38 Ariz L Rev
825, 825-26 (1996) (asserting that Lopez had "opened the floodgates" for judicial limits
on national power).
"' See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Supreme Court Review 1, 63; Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction,
and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo Wash L Rev 139, 157-61 (2001).
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back of the national regulatory state was never in the cards; there
are simply too many precedential, institutional, and political con-
straints pressing the Court to uphold relatively broad federal
power.'54 Raich may indicate that even minor incursions on the
federal edifice are unlikely, and that except in cases where to up-
hold the federal act would remove any limit whatsoever, the Court
will condone national action. As long as the next Solicitor General
has any plausible answer to Justice O'Connor's question, he seems
likely to prevail.
B. BATES AND THE COURT'S PREEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE
It may help to view Raich in conjunction with another important
federalism case from last Term that has received significantly less
attention: Bates v Dow Agrosciences,"'5 in which the Court held that
federal regulatory approvals under the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)'56 did not preempt state com-
mon law claims against a pesticide company for failure to warn of
the harms caused by its chemicals in certain types of soil. Bates is
a significant case in at least two respects. First, its rejection of a
preemption challenge to state law comes after a string of decisions
holding state common law actions preempted by federal regulatory
provisions.157 Second, and without delving into the arguments on
the merits, it struck many observers as a genuinely close case and
thus an impressive win for opponents of federal preemption.
Despite the fact that Raich and Bates both involved agricultural
production, somehow the FIFRA case did not have the same cachet
among court watchers. I have argued elsewhere, however, that
preemption cases are the most important of all for federalism
"' See Cross, 74 NYU L Rev at 1313-26 (cited in note 10); Young, 83 Tex L Rev at
92-103 (cited in note 13).
55 125 S Ct 1788 (2005). See generally The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases,
119 Harv L Rev 376 (2005).
5567 USC §§ 136-136y.
151 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 53 1 US 341 (2001) (holding that
federal law preempted state law tort claims involving medical devices); Geier v American
Honda Motor Co., 529 US 861 (2000) (holding that federal safety regulations preempted
state tort claims involving the failure to install airbags in cars); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v Shanklin,
529 US 344 (2000) (holding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempted state tort
remedies).
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doctrine.' These cases have the most direct impact on the states'
ability to make their own regulatory choices, and they often in-
volve matters that, in their practical importance, far outstrip the
policies at stake in Commerce Clause litigation."5 9 Bates's reso-
lution of a close statutory question against preemption, and by a
lopsided vote, is thus quite encouraging for those concerned about
state autonomy.
It is hard to tell whether Bates and other encouraging cases
decided in the last couple of years represent a retreat from
the Rehnquist Court's "jurispathological" (apologies to Robert
Cover 6 °) approach to preemption of state law. In his partial dissent
in Bates, Justice Thomas noted with approval that "[t]oday's decision
...comports with this Court's increasing reluctance to expand
federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of implied
pre-emption."'' On the other hand, I remain skeptical that the
Court thinks of its statutory preemption cases-which are generally
dominated by the details of the particular federal regulatory scheme
at issue-as presenting a unified set of issues to be approached in
a coherent fashion.1 6
2
The important point, however, is that if the Court would ap-
proach preemption cases in this way, then Raich-for-Bates might
be the sort of trade-off that any advocate of state autonomy ought
happily to accept. The Commerce Clause line was always unlikely
to be drawn very tightly, and therefore Congress will continue to
enjoy, for the foreseeable future, an exceptionally broad range of
potential action. The most important questions will go to what
happens within this broad area.'63 Those will not be constitutional
questions, but statutory ones, but the background norms with
"' See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 130-34 (cited in note 13). See also Calvin Massey,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 Hastings L J 431, 508 (2002) (making a similar
point).
151 See Young, 1999 Supreme Court Review at 39-42 (cited in note 53); Ernest A. Young,
Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill L Rev 1349, 1384-86 (2001).
160 See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 40-41 (1983)
(identifying the "jurispathic" function of courts in killing off rival sources of law).
61 Bates, 125 S Ct at 1807 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
162 See Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 133 (cited in note 13).
163 See Egelhoffv Egelhoff, 532 US 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J, dissenting) (stressing "the
practical importance of preserving local independence, at retail, i.e., by applying pre-
emption analysis with care, statute by statute, line by line, in order to determine how best
to reconcile a federal statute's language and purpose with federalism's need to preserve
state autonomy").
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which the Court approaches these interpretive questions are likely
to have extremely important implications for state regulatory au-
tonomy.
C. OF TOADS, MACHINE GUNS, AND SUICIDE: PROSPECTS FOR THE
ROBERTS COURT
The current Supreme Court Term will afford our first look at
a post-Rehnquist federalism jurisprudence. As this article goes to
press in February 2006, the Roberts Court has already decided a
variety of important federalism cases. In Gonzales v Oregon,'64 the
Court held that former Attorney General John Ashcroft's inter-
pretive rule stifling Oregon's experiment with legalized physician-
assisted suicide was an invalid extension of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. On the more nationalist side of the ledger, Central
Virginia Community College v Katz'6 5 and United States v Georgia'66
upheld Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Code and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, respectively. An array of important federalism cases remain
to be decided as Justice Samuel Alito takes his seat. First up are
two consolidated cases under the Clean Water Act that ask wheth-
er Congress's commerce power extends to certain sorts of wet-
lands.'67 Two cases under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations will test the power of supranational courts to preempt
state procedural law.'68 Still other cases raise important questions
64 126 S Ct 904 (2006).
.65 2006 US LEXIS 917 (Jan 23, 2006). For an early analysis, see Kevin Russell, News and
Analysis on Today's Decision in Katz, SCOTUSblog (Jan 23, 2006) (available at http://
www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/01/news-and-analys.html).
166 2006 US LEXIS 759 (Jan 10, 2006). The Court's unanimous holding was limited to suits
by disabled state prisoners complaining of ADA violations that also amounted to "actual vio-
lations" of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at **9-13. For early accounts, see Bagenstos,
Court Decides (cited in note 107); Lyle Denniston, Court Rules on State Immunity, 2 Other Issues,
SCOTUSblog (Jan 10, 2006) (available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
2006/01/courtadds some.html).
67 Rapanos v United States, No 04-1034, and Carabell v U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
No 04-1384. See generally Tony Mauro, Justice Alito's Green Day, Legal Times (Feb 8,
2006) (available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id = 1139306710859).
68 Llamas v Oregon, No 04-10566, and Bustillo vJohnson, No 05-51. On the interaction
between international, federal, and state courts in the Vienna Convention context, see
Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke LJ 1143,
1164-70, 1178-88 (2005).
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of abstention169 and the limits of state legislative control over re-
districting. 7 °
Many observers have predicted that appointments by President
George W. Bush are likely to accelerate the Court's efforts to limit
national authority.'7 ' My own view is that this is highly unlikely;
if anything, the losses of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor will yield a more nationalist court on federalism issues.
Despite her moderate instincts and reputation as a swing Justice
on many issues, Justice O'Connor was perhaps the Court's most
committed Justice on questions of state autonomy. And the Chief
Justice, while perhaps more accepting of national power in some
circumstances,' 72 deserves to be described as the programmatic
architect of the Federalist Revival. From the states' perspective,
these Justices are virtually irreplaceable.
Nor are there strong grounds to believe that Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito will share their predecessors' commitment
to limiting national power, even if these jurists turn out to be as
"conservative" as many of their supporters no doubt hope. To see
why, it may help to posit three different grounds upon which a
Justice might support federalism as a constitutional constraint.
One would be a deeply felt attachment to a particular state political
community that generates a sense of state institutions as competent
and important, most likely coupled with a more fundamental iden-
tification with a home removed from the nation's capital. Justice
O'Connor, for instance, famously served in all three branches of
state government and retained a strong attachment to her ranch
in Arizona. She seems to have felt the importance of federalism
169 Marshall v Marshall, 04-1544.
170 See LULAC v Perry, 05-204; Travis County v Perry, 05-254; Jackson v Perry, 05-276;
GI. Forum of Texas v Perry, 05-439. I have suggested elsewhere that the Texas redistricting
saga at issue in these cases may demonstrate how, contrary to conventional wisdom, po-
litical parties may subvert state autonomy at the behest of national political actors. See
Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 75 & n 351 (cited in note 13).
7' See, e.g., Adam Cohen, What's New in the Legal World? A Growing Campaign to Undo
the New Deal, NY Times (Dec 14, 2004), at A32 ("If the Supreme Court drifts rightward
in the next four years, as seems likely, it could not only roll back Congress's Commerce
Clause powers, but also revive other dangerous doctrines."). Indeed, Jack Balkin and Sandy
Levinson have claimed that the nefarious purpose of Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000), was
to ensure a string of Republican judicial appointments that would perpetuate the Court's
federalism "revolution." Balkin and Levinson, 87 Va L Rev at 1052-53 (cited in note 56).
172 See, e.g., South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (Rehnquist, CJ, writing for majority
upholding broad federal conditional spending power, over O'Connor's dissent).
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in her bones, undergirding any intellectual attachment to consti-
tutional principle.'73
A second impulse derives from a commitment to constitutional
fidelity. Whether or not one has any intrinsic brief for federalism,
one might be uncomfortable with the notion that the Supreme
Court can simply stop enforcing certain constitutional principles,
as the Court arguably did with federalism between 1937 and
1995.' One need not believe in any radical restoration of a "Con-
stitution in Exile" to think that courts should make compensating
adjustments, in marginal cases, to move back in the direction of
a constitutional balance that has been lost.7 5 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist seems most likely to have fallen into this camp. Although
the Chief spent sixteen years in private practice in Arizona, he
also spent possibly formative stints in the national military and
the federal executive branch. It seems likely that much of the
Chief's dedication to federalism came not from personal experi-
ence or attachment but rather from a sense that judges should not
be allowed to render large structural principles of the Constitution
a dead letter.
The third impulse is a belief in incrementalism or minimalism
as the preferred form of legal change. I have argued elsewhere
that incrementalism is one of federalism's primary virtues:
Whereas national action generally commits the entire nation to a
particular policy course, limits on such action leave the states free
to experiment, as well as to simply reflect the divergent preferences
of their citizens.'76 Proponents of change must work one state at
a time, and individual states can rely on the experience of their
fellows in evaluating proposed reforms. Justice O'Connor and Jus-
tice Kennedy-another key voice for state autonomy in many
cases, Raich notwithstanding-have both been described as "ju-
'17 To take another (purely hypothetical) example, one might feel similarly if one were
a professor at a large state university in Texas and descended from Texas ranchers on one
side and Texas football coaches on the other.
... See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev
1231, 1233-37 (1994); Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1764-75 (cited in note 19).
"' On the "Constitution in Exile," see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot,
Regulation, No 1, 1995, at 83. For an approach based on compensating adjustments, see
Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1748-62 (cited in note 19).
76 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 Geo Wash
L Rev (forthcoming 2006).
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dicial minimalists," committed to deciding "one case at a time." '177
It is not surprising that they also tend to emphasize the advantages
of state-by-state policy diversity in their opinions upholding state
autonomy.178
I do not mean to exclude entirely the influence of other pref-
erences-even political preferences, like a hostility to government
regulation or to private plaintiffs, of the sort discussed in Part I.
Nor do I mean to suggest that the impulses surveyed here are not
themselves "political," at least in a sense. But that sense is far more
nuanced than the political hypothesis can accommodate. Consti-
tutional fidelity is surely grounded, to some extent, in conservative
suspicion of radical change 179 -but it is also a legal interpretation
of the obligation of the judge in constitutional cases. Affinities for
state institutions and commitments to incrementalism are likewise
views that may exist apart from strictly legal interpretations of the
Constitutional text, history, and precedents, but to say that is
hardly to accept the attitudinalist view. Almost every constitutional
case involves, for example, practical judgments made with highly
imperfect information. Cases about the scope of federal common
lawmaking authority, for instance, involve judgments about the
importance of policy uniformity on a given question;"'8 the "nec-
essary and proper" argument in Raich likewise involved a practical
judgment about necessity. General views about the competence of
state institutions and the desirability of policy diversity will inform
these judgments. But this form of "political" influence informs the
application of a legal standard-it does not serve as an alternative
mode of decision that the legal arguments simply mask.
It must also be conceded that the impulses I have identified are
far from absolute indicators. Justice Souter is often a minimalist,'
and surely no Justice bears a stronger attachment to an outside-
the-Beltway hearth and home, but no one has been a more de-
termined opponent of constitutional restraints on national au-
177 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999);
see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992).
"' See Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 458 (1991) (O'Connor); United States v Lopez,
514 US 549, 581-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J, concurring).
"9 See Young, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1772 (cited in note 19).
"'0 See United States v Kimbell Foods, 440 US 715, 727-3 3 (1979).
' See Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 72 NC L Rev 619, 718-19 (1994).
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thority. Chief Justice Rehnquist seemingly had little reason to care
about federalism other than constitutional fidelity, and yet ended
up leading the Federalist Revival. That said, one can plausibly
infer that the strongest proponents of limits on national power
will be Justices like O'Connor that combine two or more of these
impulses, and that a bare impulse toward constitutional fidelity
will often-but not always-be insufficient to make one an en-
thusiastic federalist. I have already discussed how Justice Scalia's
vote in Raich may reflect a set of structural interests focused pri-
marily on separation of powers, not federalism.182 This should be
relatively unsurprising: Nothing in Justice Scalia's background or
professed methodology reflects any affinity for state governmental
institutions or for incrementalism.1
3
Chief Justice Roberts's confirmation process was marked by
concerns that he would roll back federal power to prehistoric lev-
els. These concerns were engendered primarily by a dissenting
opinion concerning a case that involved a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to the Endangered Species Act.'84 There, Judge Roberts
doubted Congress's ability to protect "a hapless toad that, for
reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California."' 5 But there
is every reason to think, "hapless toads" notwithstanding, that
Roberts is an executive-branch conservative in the mold of Justice
2' See text accompanying note 20. Even in Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997)-
surely Justice Scalia's most important federalism opinion-he grounds the doctrine that
Congress may not "commandeer" state executive officials to enforce federal law not only
in federalism but also in fears that Congress's appropriation of state executive personnel
would undermine the federal unitary executive. See id at 922-23. Brad Clark has argued
vigorously that Justice Scalia's commitments to federalism and separation of powers are
complementary, see Clark, 47 SLU L J at 770 (cited in note 20), and I have little doubt
that this is often true. My point is simply that his primary interest is in separation of
powers, and that if push comes to shove he will prefer his established separation of powers
commitments to any concern about federalism. In two important preemption cases, for
example, Justice Scalia has emphasized his strong view of judicial deference to executive
agency interpretations of law over important federalism concerns. See Gonzales v Oregon,
126 S Ct 904, 926 (2006) (Scalia, J, dissenting); AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utils Bd, 525 US 366,
378 n 6 (1999).
183 See also Young, 72 NC L Rev at 681-86 (cited in note 181) (critiquing Justice Scalia's
commitment to bright-line rules from a Burkean incrementalist perspective).
114 See, e.g., Scrutinizing John Roberts, NY Times (July 20, 2005), at A22 (reporting that
Judge Roberts "dissented in an Endangered Species Act case in a way that suggested he
might hold an array of environmental laws, and other important federal protections, to
be unconstitutional"). The case in question was Rancho Viejo LLC v Norton, 334 F3d 1158
(DC Cir 2003), in which Judge Roberts dissented from a denial of rehearing en banc. He
stopped short of arguing that the ESA was, in fact, unconstitutional, and even offered an
alternative rationale for upholding the statute. Id at 1160.
185 Id.
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Scalia."5 6 Roberts's professional life, after all, has been spent either
in the federal government or as a Washington lawyer preoccupied
with questions of federal law; he has no record of participation in
or commitment to the institutions of state government comparable
to Justice O'Connor's. It seems quite plausible, for example, that
Chief Justice Roberts would have voted with Scalia in Raich. This
expectation seemed to be borne out by the oral argument in the
first major federalism case of the Roberts Court, at which the new
Chief reportedly "stepped forward . ..as an aggressive defender
of federal authority to block doctor-assisted suicide."'87 And, in
fact, when Gonzales v Oregon came down in January, the new Chief
Justice joined Justice Scalia's dissent arguing that the Controlled
Substances Act should be read to confer broad authority on the
Attorney General to preempt state regulation of doctors.'88
Judge Alito's considerably longer record of decided cases yields
a few more hints of concern for state autonomy.'89 His dissent in
United States v Rybar19 ° argued that 18 USC § 922(o), which reg-
ulates the possession and transfer of machine guns, was an invalid
exercise of the Commerce power. The Rybar dissent is a compar-
atively aggressive application of Lopez, and it suggests that Alito
might have been with the dissenters in Raich.'9 ' Nonetheless, like
Roberts's, Judge Alito's resum6 has a strongly national tilt: Indeed,
Alito has spent his entire professional life as an employee of the
186 See Merrill, 47 SLU L J at 609-12 (cited in note 20).
187 Roberts' Debut: Right-to-Die Case, St. Petersburg Times (Oct 6, 2005), at LA.
180 See 126 S Ct at 779-94 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
189 For the breathless tone of concerns about Judge Alito's pro-states leanings, see An-
other Lost Opportunity, NY Times (Nov 1, 2005), at A26 (worrying about "Judge Alito's
frequent rulings to undermine the federal government's authority to address momentous
national problems").
1 0 103 F3d 273 (3d Cir 1996).
'9' The considerable attention devoted to Judge Alito's majority opinion in Cbittister v
Dept of Community & Econ. Development, 226 F3d 223 (3d Cir 2000), by contrast, seems
misplaced. In that case, the Third Circuit held that the sick-leave provision of the Family
Medical Leave Act was not a valid exercise of the Section 5 power, so that Congress could
not abrogate state sovereign immunity for individual damages claims under the statute.
Judge Alito has been criticized for not anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada
Dept of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721 (2003), which upheld such abrogation for
the family-care provisions of the FMLA. It will suffice to say that very few Eleventh
Amendment aficionados expected any part of the FMLA to pass muster in Hibbs, and the
provision that Chittister struck down is sufficiently more difficult to defend under Section
5 that two circuits have struck it down even after Hibbs. See Touvell v Ohio Dept of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F3d 392 (6th Cir 2005); Brockman v Wyoming
Dept of Family Servs, 342 F3d 1159 (10th Cir 2003).
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national government, much of that time as a Justice Department
lawyer charged with implementing and defending national pol-
icy.'92 Despite concerns in the press that he may "envision a dra-
matic curtailing of national power,"' 93 it is hard to see Alito de-
veloping into an ardent partisan of states' rights.
All this gives some reason to worry that the Federalist Revival,
such as it was, may be drawing to a close. There is, however, a
more optimistic scenario from the perspective of state autonomy.
Five years ago, in the pages of this journal, I pleaded for the
Federalist Five to adopt a more moderate approach to state sov-
ereign immunity that might encourage the more Nationalist Four
to support a judicially enforceable notion of enumerated powers.' 94
The Court's recent decisions in Hibbs and Lane do, indeed, show
at least some members of the Five moderating their positions on
sovereign immunity and the Section 5 power. 9 5 But Raich reflects
the Four's continued intransigence on enumerated-powers ques-
tions. The question is whether two new Justices can do any better
at forging a consensus position that can attract support from across
the Court's ideological spectrum.
To the extent that Roberts and Alito do care about federalism,
they may turn out to be more effective advocates for it than the
other pro-states Justices on the current Court. Justice O'Connor's
affinity for open-ended balancing could hardly reassure Justices
worried, as Souter and Breyer have been, about the ability of courts
to identify principled limitations on federal power once they re-
open the Pandora's Box of judicial review in this area.'9 6 Likewise,
192 See the official White House biography at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
judicialnominees/alito.html.
193 Editorial, Judge Alito on the States, Wash Post (Nov 21, 2005), at A14.
194 See Young, 1999 Supreme Court Review at 68-73 (cited in note 53).
195 The two state sovereign immunity cases decided in January 2006 continued this trend.
See United States v Georgia, 2006 US LEXIS 759 (Jan 10, 2006) (upholding abrogation
of state immunity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, where the alleged
statutory violation is also a constitutional violation); Central Virginia Community College v
Katz, 2006 US LEXIS 917 (Jan 23, 2006) (upholding Congress's authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code). Katz is particularly significant, as
it cut back on the Court's earlier suggestion that none of Congress's Article I powers
would suffice to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 636 (1999). Justice O'Connor provided
the fifth vote in Katz; Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Thomas's dissent, which main-
tained the Seminole/Alden line on state immunities. Much will thus turn on the position
that Justice Alito adopts in the next state sovereign immunity case.
96 See Lopez, 514 US at 604 (Souter, J, dissenting); id at 627-28 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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Thomas's radicalism, Scalia's combativeness, Rehnquist's impatience
with extended reason-giving, and Kennedy's sheer unpredictability
created serious handicaps in this regard. As a seasoned doctrinal
advocate known for his collegiality, Chief Justice Roberts may well
be positioned to play a Brennan-like role-perhaps even reaching
out to members of the Nationalist Four to forge the principled middle
ground on federalism that has eluded the Court for so long.
The other half of a viable way forward, in my view, is for a solid
majority of the Court to recognize that the values of constitutional
federalism are implicated not only in cases that test the limits of
Congress's power, but also in statutory construction cases that assess
how far a given enactment has actually gone. I have already discussed
the importance of preemption cases like Bates for preserving state
autonomy.'97 On this score, the decision in Gonzales v Oregon up-
holding Oregon's physician-assisted suicide regime is encouraging.
Especially after Raich, the primary restraints on the Commerce
Clause will be political. Under those circumstances, it is important
that the Court demand a relatively clear statement from Congress
when it wishes to intrude into areas of traditional state authority
(like medical practice). It is equally critical that federal preemptive
authority actually be exercised by Congress, which is at least subject
to political and inertial checks, rather than by executive actors that
can act more easily and without input from the states' elected rep-
resentatives.198 Although it seemed relatively clear at the macro-
level that Congress did not intend to grant a general regulatory
power over medical practice to the Attorney General under the
CSA, the structure of the Act was complex and included relatively
open-ended delegations of power. The willingness of six Justices in
the Oregon case to resolve these questions against the Attorney
General bodes well for the survival of some elements of process
federalism, notwithstanding the Raich majority's aversion to hard
substantive limits on national authority.
CONCLUSION
There is some consolation in Justice O'Connor's descrip-
'9 See Section II.B.
'9' See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex L
Rev 1321, 1433 (2001); Young, 83 Tex L Rev at 88-91 (cited in note 13).
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tion of federalism as "our oldest question of constitutional law." '199
While the balance of power between the nation and the states has
steadily shifted in favor of the former over the 230 years of our
history, one need look no further than current debates over air
pollution, gay marriage, and the death penalty to see that federalism
remains a vital force in our polity. This is true notwithstanding
considerable ebbs and flows in the willingness of the federal courts
to enforce constitutional limits on national power. Even in the case
of medical marijuana, state legislation remains a considerable prac-
tical impediment to the imposition of a uniform national drug pol-
icy.2"0 On the constitutional side, much life remains in the anti-
commandeering doctrine, state sovereign immunity, pro-federalism
clear statement rules-and, I have argued, even aspects of Com-
merce Clause doctrine. It is, of course, far too early to tell whether
the accomplishments of the Rehnquist Court will endure. But it is
unlikely that Raich spells the end of the conversation.
99 New York v United States, 505 US 144, 149 (1992).
210 See, e.g., M. L. Johnson, House Overrides Carcieri's Medical Marijuana Veto, Boston
Globe (Jan 3, 2006) (available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode-island/articles/
2006/01/03/house members overridecarcierismedical-marijuanaveto/) (noting that
even after the Court's decision in Raicb, "[flederal authorities conceded they were unlikely
to prosecute many medicinal users, and Rhode Island lawmakers pressed on, passing their
medical marijuana bill on June 7").
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